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REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP IN THE POST-REALIST ERA
Marin Roger Scordato*
I. INTRODUCTION
With formal apprenticeships having largely become a
relic of the past, the passing of legal culture to the next
generation of lawyers, at least in the first few critical years of
their assimilation into the profession, now takes place
overwhelmingly at graduate schools of law.1 While the
culture of law schools may not exert a continuing influence on
mature practitioners, it does have a profound effect on the
way that nearly every practicing attorney initially
understands the nature and function of law.2 In at least this
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1. Felix Frankfurter, a former professor at Harvard Law School, wrote,
"[iun the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law and the
lawyers are what the law schools make them." RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY
JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES
OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989) (quoting Letter from Professor Felix
Frankfurter to Julius Rosenwald (May 13, 1927); see generally Marie A.
Monahan, Towards a Theory of Assimilating Law Students into the Culture of
the Legal Profession, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 215 (2001) (identifying the legal skills
taught in legal writing and judicial externship courses and discussing different
teaching approaches with a focus on the social perspective).
2. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 109 (1993) ("However diverse their professional experiences
may be in other respects,... lawyers still share at least one thing in common:
[Tihey have all been law students at one time or another, and it is as students
that their professional habits first take shape."); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Law
School as a Culture of Conversation: Re-imagining Legal Education as a Process
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way, the concepts of law and the legal system that are in
vogue among legal academics at any given time exert a
powerful influence on the evolution of legal culture and on the
way in which nearly every practicing attorney initially
understands the nature and function of law.
When I began the full-time teaching of law some twenty
years ago in the mid-1980s, one of the prevalent values
among law school faculty was the desire to demonstrate to
students that law could not be understood in a satisfying way
as a system of definite rules that could be mechanistically
applied to factual situations and thereby yield definitive
results.4 It was thought to be important to make sure
students understood that legally operative language was
rarely self-defining, that ambiguity was frequently present
and that value-laden choices could not be avoided in the
process of interpreting and applying legal standards.5
of Conversion to the Demands of Authentic Conversation, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
333, 335 (1996) ("[Llegal education might best be understood as a process that
serves to bring the law student into this culture of constitutive conversation. In
fact, the law school itself can be imagined as a culture of conversation that seeks
the conversion-or 're-horizoning'--of law students." (quoting Frank P. Braio,
Towards the Re-Horizoning of Subjects: Re-Structuring Classical-Modern
Educational Prospectives, in 13 METHOD: J. OF LONERGAN STUD. 99-109
(1995))).
3. See Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final
Examination Law School, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 152 (2001) ("[In the hands of
master teachers who are working with exceptionally bright and committed
students, the case method may teach much about the nature of complex legal
arguments, legal problem solving and legal imagination."); Eric A. DeGroff &
Kathleen A. McKee, Learning Like Lawyers: Addressing the Differences in Law
Student Learning Styles, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 499, 500 (2006) ("Law
schools have stressed to generations of students the importance of learning to
'think like lawyers.'").
4. See Addison Mueller & Murray L. Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral
Principles, 7 UCLA L. REV. 571, 586 (1960) ("The difficulty... is that there will
always be a point at which an extension of the logic of any constitutional
principle of decision will run into the similarly extended logic of competing
principles."); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOvEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 41-42 (1995) ("Even if one were to accept
the existence of 'reasoned elaboration,' 'neutral principles,' or 'objective
interpretation,' judges would still need guidelines to know how to choose
between any number of possible competing principles ascertainable from
different interpretations of the constitution, legislation and prior court
decisions.").
5. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810-12 (1935) (examining how the New York
Court of Appeals decided case in terms of "transcendental nonsense"); Duncan
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
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The mark of a sophisticated approach to legal analysis,
either in print or in the classroom, was the eagerness with
which one looked behind the surface of legal doctrine and
sought to understand its deeper meaning by reference to the
social purposes that it was intended to serve.6 The telltale
sign of a naive and outdated approach was a preoccupation
with formal precedent and an insistence on deriving general
principles from prior decisions that were then applied in a
logically deductive fashion to resolve new problems.7 The
most respected scholars and teachers were those whose
primary focus was on the social purposes underlying the
doctrine and who taught their students to habitually answer
the question, "what does this doctrine mean?" by asking the
question, "what set of social policies does this doctrine seek to
advance?"'
The law school environment that I experienced as a
student, and then a few years later as a faculty member, was
intellectually lively and exciting.9 It was very satisfying to
guide students away from the innocent faith in an objective,
mechanistic notion of law and to help them develop an ability
to identify plausible policy concerns and to use them to craft
persuasive legal arguments.1 ° It was fascinating to watch the
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 9-14
(1980); see generally PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 99-265 (1965).
6. See Jerry Elmer, Legal Realism, Legal Formalism and the D'Oench
Duhme Doctrine: A Perspective on R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. NFD, 53
R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (2004) ("Today, we are all Legal Realists. Being Realists, we
understand two things: that judges do make law, not just find it, and that
public policy considerations may properly enter into a judge's deliberations.").
7. Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) ("A belief in
formalism dominated jurisprudence during the nineteenth century. Principles
of law were seen as existing as part of the natural law and the role of judges
was to discover them. Judging was conceived as a relatively mechanical act of
applying law to the facts of the particular case.").
8. See James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431,
460 (1985) ("By focusing on the policy effects and on the diverse resolutions of
similar cases, the realists demonstrated how judges made law according to their
underlying beliefs. The process was inherently political.").
9. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1986)
("The 1970s were an exciting and unusual time for legal education in America.
The period was marked by the emergence of two jurisprudential movements
which filled classrooms and law reviews with a remarkable spirit and energy.
Today everyone is talking about theory.").
10. See Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How Should Law Schools
Judge Teaching?, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 407, 447 (1990) ("Most students appear to
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development in the literature of ever more elaborate and
subtle accounts of the social purposes and consequences of
various areas of jurisprudence.
This was a time when both Critical Legal Studies and
Law & Economics were vibrant and ascendant, and there
nevertheless remained enough stalwart traditionalists to
decry both movements." Different law schools were
prominently aligned with one approach or the other. 2
Passionate arguments frequently flared among adherents of
different movements and among writers within a given
movement. 3 Eminent members of the legal academy publicly
enter law school already imbued with the view of the nineteenth-century
German pandectists that law is a comprehensive, logically consistent system of
rules, which mechanically produce outcomes when applied to unambiguous
facts. They talk as though legal realism (much less critical legal studies) had
never happened."); SOL LINOWITz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 116 (1994) ("The task of the law
professor is often to change a student's mind, and then change it back again,
until the student and the class understand that in many situations that will
come before them professionally they can with a whole heart devote their skills
to either side.").
11. Guido Calabresi's influential law and economics treatment of tort law,
The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, was published in 1970.
Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law was published in 1972. What is
quite likely the seminal text in Critical Legal Studies literature, Roberto
Unger's, Knowledge and Politics, was published in 1975. Just one year later,
Duncan Kennedy published Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976). See Louis Michael Seidman, Critical
Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576 (2006) ("The emergence
of critical legal studies [CLS] was accompanied by a remarkable outpouring of
creativity, energy, and anger. For at least a brief period, it was at the center of
the legal academy. Over a wide range of legal fields, one simply could not write
or think seriously about a subject without taking some account of the critical
(crit) interpretation."); David Andrew Price, Taking Rights Cynically: A Review
of Critical Legal Studies, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271 (1989) (criticizing critical legal
studies).
12. See Fiss, supra note 9, at 1 ("Critical legal studies is deeply entrenched
in two of the most prestigious law schools in the country, Harvard and
Stanford."); LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES 281, 287
(2005) ("Critical Legal Studies could not have happened without Harvard ....
Yale, which celebrated its association with legal realism, became known for its
alleged intolerance to Critical Legal Studies."); Tracey E. George, An Empirical
Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141,
159 (2006) ("The University of Chicago is considered the home of law and
economics.").
13. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 23 (1989) (critically examining some of the behavioral assumptions of law
and economics); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 270 (1980) ("In light of the Realists' brilliant analyses of
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suggested that faculty members who embraced certain ideas
about the nature of law did not belong in a law school
classroom. 1
4
The feeling was everywhere in the air that big ideas were
in play.15  The stakes were thought to be high. 6  A newly
published article by a prominent member of one movement or
another was quickly sought out and examined to see in what
way the analysis, and the debate, had been advanced.
17  It
the underlying social and political premises of the market, it would be
particularly ironic if the Law and Economics movement should succeed in
reestablishing Classical Legal Thought's reified picture of the market as
neutral, natural and necessary."); IAN WARD, KANTIANISM, POSTMODERNISM
AND CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 114, 119-22 (1997) (discussing the debate
between critical legal studies scholars Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel).
14. This included the Dean of the Duke Law School. See Paul D.
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227(1984) ("The
professionalism and intellectual courage of lawyers . . . cannot abide . . . the
embrace of nihilism .... Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does,
result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation. In an
honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist teachers are more likely
to train crooks than radicals."). For subsequent exchanges of correspondence
among Paul Brest, Guido Calabresi, Paul Carrington, Owen Fiss, Robert
Gordon, Phillip Johnson, Peter Martin, Louis Schwartz and William Van
Alstyne regarding Carrington's article, see Robert W. Gordon, et al., "Of Law
and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1
(1985).
15. Critical Legal Studies, a movement that generated as abstract and
dense a literature as any in legal scholarship, still managed to attract the
attention and the ire of Calvin Trillin in the New Yorker. See Calvin Trillin, A
Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53. Other
popular media treatment of Critical Legal Studies include: Louis Menand, What
is "Critical Legal Studies?": Radicalism for Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17,
1986, at 20; Jerry Frug, Henry James, Lee Marvin and the Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1986, § 7, at 1 (book review); Richard Lacayo, Critical Legal Times at
Harvard, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87.
16. See Fiss, supra note 9. Owen Fiss has argued that both law and
economics and critical legal studies were dangerous movements. Id. Fiss wrote:
[L]aw will exist even if the two jurisprudential movements of which I
have spoken are victorious, in the limited sense that there will be
people who wear black robes and decide cases, but it will be a very
different kind of law. For (Judge) Kennedy, adjudication will be
entirely particularistic; for Judge Posner it will be wholly instrumental.
In neither case will it be capable of sustaining or generating a public
morality. It will be law without inspiration. This will mean the death of
the law, as we have known it throughout history, and as we have come
to admire it.
Id., at 15-16.
17. In addition to law and economics and critical legal studies, it was during
this same period that the law and society movement began to flourish. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763
(1986) (commenting on the history and nature of the law and society
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was in many ways a flat out fun time to be a law professor.'
In the years since, things have settled down considerably.
Critical Legal Studies, as a separate school of thought, has all
but vanished. 9 Today, employing some of the concepts of
economics to explain the operation and effect of legal doctrine
hardly serves as an announcement of your allegiance to a
distinct intellectual movement.20  Law schools appear to be
far more concerned with their annual ranking in U.S. News
and World Report, and with the growth of their endowments,
than in doing intellectual battle over the proper
understanding of the nature of law.2 Unconcealed and
unapologetic careerism, both at the individual faculty and the
larger institutional level, feels pervasive. 2
2
movement); Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and
Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW
& Socly REV. 409 (1998) (telling the story of the establishment of the Law and
Society Association).
18. See, e.g., David Shapiro's parody of critical legal studies, David L.
Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1984)
(writing casual and comedic article with such headings as "Pretending-the-
problem-isn't-there-icism" and "Poopification").
19. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS To AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW 121 (2006) ("CLS no longer exists as a concrete movement and has
had no evident impact on legal doctrine . . . ."); Seidman, supra note 11, at 583-
84 (observing that critical legal studies "now has less influence than at any time
since its emergence .... [Ilts proponents have grown older and lost energy, and
a new generation has different interests and priorities.").
20. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 132 ("Many law professors teach and
incorporate into their scholarship aspects of law and economics without
endorsing its more elaborate claims."); Lawrence Lessig, The Prolific Iconoclast:
To Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner, A Founder of the Law and Economics
Movement, the Greatest Sin is that of Conformism, 21 AM. LAWYER 105, 105
(Dec. 1999) ("We are all law-and-economists now.").
21. See Kim Economides, Cynical Legal Studies, in EDUCATING FOR
JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION 26 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise
G. Trubek eds., 1997) ("[T]he modern law school itself is besieged by market
values, external audit and managerialism which increasingly pull it away from
its historic mission of independent intellectual inquiry and public service."); see
also Amanda Bronstad, Funding the Future: As State Funds Wilt, Public Law
Schools Step Up Fundraising, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2007, at 1.
22. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, The
Elite Law School, and The Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 705, 752 (1998) ("In sum, the academy appears to be in the grip of a
materialism that is as pervasive as the materialism gripping the practicing bar.
Although the academy's materialism is of a different nature--it focuses on the
pursuit of prestige rather than wealth, and it is measured by publications
rather than billings--the academy's materialism, no less than the profession's, is
claiming mentoring and, in a larger sense, the ethical practice of law as its
victims.").
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Looking back, it seems to me that an important part of
what animated that period was its relative proximity to a
seismic shift in the conventional understanding of the nature
of the common law and appellate legal processes.23 During
the middle third of the twentieth century the conventional
wisdom, at least in law school culture, regarding the nature of
appellate court analysis and judicial review experienced a
fundamental paradigm shift.24 Convinced by the critique of
the legal realists, most legal scholars lost faith in the
traditional formalist account of the common law and began to
understand the nature of appellate court adjudication from
an instrumentalist perspective.25
I believe that many features of our current legal
environment can be understood as either reactions to, logical
consequences flowing from, or partial denials of the shift from
formalism to instrumentalism.26 Among the more confusing
aspects of our contemporary period is that different segments
of the legal community, and the broader culture beyond, have
acknowledged, accepted and adjusted to this essential
conceptual shift to widely varying degrees. In a very real
sense, different communities within the legal culture are
currently approaching the practice of law and of law making,
at least at the level of explicit expression, from fundamentally
different conceptual frameworks.
23. See Marin R. Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism
and the Hybrid Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263, 266-85
(2007).
24. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (detailing the struggle in
American law between the entrenched legal orthodoxy and the Progressive
movement).
25. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA.
L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (1972) (discussing the "rise of Progressivism as a critique
of late nineteenth-century social thought and the emergence of Sociological
Jurisprudence as a protest against the 'mechanical jurisprudence' of the last
quarter of the nineteenth century."); see generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972) (discussing the use of social
science by the courts and the response to such use).
26. See Scordato, supra note 23, at 266-85.
27. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 232-33 ("This mix of judicial
philosophies among judges exists at all levels of the judiciary. Individual judges
sometimes shift from one philosophy to another .... The result of this mish-
mash of contrasting orientations is a system of judging suspended in uncertain
and shifting space, with some judges freed of the shackles of being rigidly rule-
bound, yet not entirely comfortable with this freedom, and other judges
359
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It is the purpose of this article to consider some of the
consequences for legal scholarship of this shift from
formalism to instrumentalism. As an activity that seeks to
understand the nature and operation of law, and to
communicate that understanding to others, legal scholarship
can be expected to be profoundly affected by this paradigm
shift. It is also an activity that is engaged in by a segment of
the legal community, namely law professors, who have been
among the most receptive to the shift and who have most
eagerly pursued the paths that the new paradigm has
offered.28 Moreover, as mentioned above, it is an activity that
takes place primarily in law schools, and as such it exerts an
important influence on the view of law first encountered by
the next generation of attorneys.29
Following this introduction, Section II of this article very
briefly describes the fundamental shift from formalism
through legal realism to modern instrumentalism that has
characterized much of the last century in American
jurisprudence. The next Section identifies the traditional
functions of legal scholarship and discusses how the shift
from formalism to instrumentalism has importantly changed
the relationship of legal scholarship to the work of the courts,
especially the appellate courts. Section IV deals with the
nature of descriptive legal scholarship in the post-realist
period, identifying and analyzing what is termed first-order
and second-order descriptive scholarship, and further
distinguishing between two importantly different kinds of
second-order descriptive scholarship. In Section V, the
nature of normative legal scholarship within an
instrumentalist paradigm is discussed. After describing
normative scholarship under formalism and the ways in
which scholars have tried to retain some of its virtues in the
post-realist period, the section focuses on the fundamental
insisting on being rule-bound (though not every time).").
28. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 32 ("Most law teachers today regard
themselves as legal realists.").
29. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 117 ("Since the 1970s, when the
instrumental view of law infused the legal academy, law students have been
trained to see law as purely an instrument. These are the lawyers of today, who
permeate society and its structures of power, corporate lawyers, cause lawyers,
law professors, judges, legally trained legislators and their staffs,
administrative agency officials, executive branch officials, and lawyer-
lobbyists.").
360 [Vol:48
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challenge that instrumentalism poses for normative legal
scholarship and discusses various problems posed by the two
currently prevailing responses to that challenge. Section VI
concludes the article.
II. FROM FORMALISM TO INSTRUMENTALISM
Starting not long after the turn of the century and
engaged in most vigorously during the 1930s and thereafter,
legal realists aggressively critiqued the long-standing
formalist model of an ever-improving common law seeking
the ideal, maintained and implemented by technician judges
who predominately employed the tools of formal logic and
objective legal analysis to reach inevitable results in specific
cases.30  In its place, the realists suggested a legal system
that developed and employed rules in an effort to solve
specific social problems or to achieve particular social goals.3 1
The function of a judge in such a system, especially at the
appellate level, was to insure that the application of discrete
doctrine in specific cases advanced the intended social
purposes behind that doctrine, to monitor the overall
effectiveness of existing common law in achieving the desired
social consequences and to alter the existing law as needed to
better serve the underlying social goals.32 Far from operating
as the detached analytical technician envisioned by the
30. See MICHAEL D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 90 (7th ed. 2001) (1959) ("[T]he essence of natural law may be
said to lie in the constant assertion that there are objective moral principles
which depend upon the nature of the universe .... An appropriate analogy are
mathematical axioms which hold good even when misunderstood or
undiscovered."); Henry Mather, Natural Law and Liberalism, 52 S.C. L. REV.
331, 332 (2001) ("Natural law theories assert that positive, man-made law
should be formulated and evaluated according to a higher moral law (the
natural law) that is not made by humans, but is inherent in the nature of the
universe.").
31. An excellent description of the realist critique of formalism can be found
at HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 183-230.
32. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1780-1860, at 30 (1977) ("Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of
principles expressed in custom and derived from natural law. Nor was it
regarded primarily as a body of rules designed to achieve justice only in the
individual case. Instead, judges came to think of the common law as equally
responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially
desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument of policy encouraged
innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal doctrine with the self-
conscious goal of bringing about social change.").
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formalists,33 judges in a realist world were thought to be
enmeshed in value-laden choices regarding the identification
of important social goals and the best means of achieving
them. 4
Under traditional formalism, law was seen as the
painstaking articulation of first principles, a journey of
constant elaboration and refinement on the way to an ideal
set of doctrines-a true reflection of the natural law.35 To the
legal realists, law was a tool that society employed at a given
time to solve perceived problems or to achieve desired goals. 6
A change in law was typically necessitated not by a desire to
move it closer to some abstract ideal, but to better respond to
new social challenges or to changes in the regulated
environment.37
33. See Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303
(1927), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 242, 247-48 (William W. Fisher
et al. eds., 1993) (expressing surprise that "eminent members of the bar ...
assert that all a court does in deciding doubtful cases is to deduce conclusions
from fixed premises." and quoting one such "eminent" member of the bar, and
"well known student of legal history and jurisprudence," as saying, "[elvery
judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The figure of
its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts . . . and the
application of the rule is a logical necessity.").
34. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)
(examining the judicial thinking process); Cohen, supra note 5, at 810-12; John
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924) (discussing the
logical method in legal reasoning and judicial decisions); Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908) ("Being scientific
as a means towards an end, [the law] must be judged by the results it achieves,
not by the niceties of its internal structure; it must be valued by the extent to
which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness
with which its rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation.").
35. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9-64
(1995); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977); HORWITZ,
supra note 24, at 16-17; MINDA, supra note 4, at 13-33; ROBERT SAMUEL
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 136-59 (1982).
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Joseph H. Beale, Sir William Blackstone and
James Barr Ames are frequently identified as classical formalists. See
DUXBURY, supra at 9-25.
As with any single label for a broad and sophisticated body of thought,
"formalism" is not always taken as having a clear and univocal meaning. See
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
638 (1999); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1138, 1144 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
36. See SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 20-21.
37. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE
505 (2d ed. 2004) ("The need to 'adapt' a non-statutory common law tradition to
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For the realists, the reasons why a legal doctrine should
embrace any one of a number of logically possible versions
had everything to do with the relative desirability of the
practical social consequences likely to be generated by each
possible version of the doctrine.3 ' Thus, for example, tort
law's decision to adopt or to not adopt an affirmative duty to
reasonably rescue a stranger in peril should not be made on
the basis of which version of the rule best articulates abstract
notions of social obligation or best conforms, as a logical
matter, to the existing pattern of affirmative duties. 9
Instead, the decision should be made based on the relative
desirability of the likely practical consequences of either
adopting an affirmative duty to aid or refraining to do so.4"
The shift from formalism to what could, for convenience,
be labeled instrumentalism was very much like the kind of
profound paradigm shift in the natural and social sciences
that has been famously described by Thomas Kuhn.41 By the
mid-1980s, less than fifty years had passed since the serious
start of the realist movement.42  The initial intellectual
excitement occasioned by the shift in the conventional
paradigm of how law was understood to operate was still
evident.43 Energy naturally flowed to projects designed to
new settings gave powerful judges law-making opportunities equivalent to those
of the legislatures themselves. The classical common law theory of law as
immemorial custom was a shallow fiction. Judges . . . boldly used judicial
opinions to create a law for a new America. This was the point of
'instrumentalism.").
38. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (Gaunt,
Inc. 1998) (1921) ("The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence.").
39. It arguably does neither. See Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1189
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) ("An enlightened society should no longer excuse the
immoral and outrageous conduct of a person who allows another to drown,
simply because he doesn't wish to get his feet wet."); Philip W. Romohr, A
Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations of the No-
Duty-To-Rescue Rule, 55 DuKE L.J. 1025, 1027 (2006) (concluding that "most, if
not all, of these theories [of political and moral philosophy] support some form of
duty to rescue.").
40. See Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (2008).
41. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed.
1996) (outlining how sciences are forced to go through a paradigm-shift).
42. The first self-conscious statement of legal realism is said to be Karl
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930), followed shortly thereafter by Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about
Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
43. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2007) ("American
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apply this new perspective across the broad spectrum of legal
doctrine. Scholars eagerly worked at developing the
fundamental instrumentalist rationale for each substantive
area. Contract law stopped being about identifying meetings
of the mind and defining the abstract obligation to make good
on a promise and began focusing on maximizing socially
beneficial reliance and efficiently allocating the risks of
promissory transactions."
In retrospect, from this perspective, the heated debates
among the Critical Legal Theorists, the devotees of Law and
Economics, and other competing schools of thought were
primarily intramural battles.45  Despite their many
differences, most all of these intellectual movements shared a
thoroughly modern instrumentalist conception of the law,
especially the common law. 6  The arguments were
overwhelmingly over the accurate identification of the
underlying social purposes and the practical social
consequences of legal doctrine .4  The only clear losers
Legal Realism was, quite justifiably, the major intellectual event in 20th
century American legal practice and scholarship.").
44. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1263-64 (1980)
(focusing on the principles of bargain, detrimental reliance and unjust
enrichment and examining promissory liability in terms welfare effects);
SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 151.
45. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 118 ("Almost all of the major
theoretical and empirical perspectives toward law that circulate today
developed during the 1960s and 1970s, or have roots in that period, and
characterize law in fundamentally instrumental terms."); PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5
(Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000) ("The tradition of legal
realism . . .has in recent years been revived and radicalized in the theoretical
movement known as 'critical legal studies.'"); LEITER, supra note 43, at 1 n.1
("[Elconomic analysis of law (the most influential intellectual event in American
law since the 1970s) is reasonably understood as a continuation of the Realist
program.").
46. See Fiss, supra note 9, at 2 ("Both law and economics and critical legal
studies are united in their rejection of the notion of law as public ideal. One
school proclaims 'law is efficient,' the other that 'law is politics.' But neither is
willing to take law on its own terms, and to accept adjudication as an
institutional arrangement in which public officials seek to elaborate and protect
the values that we hold in common.").
47. It should be said that there existed a more radical element of critical
legal studies that challenged, on both practical and philosophical grounds, the
classical liberal notion of a rule of law that could constrain the power of the
state and protect individual liberties. For an excellent analysis of these
critiques and possible liberal responses to them, see ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
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emerging from this period were those who sought to defend
and maintain a dominantly formalist concept of law. 48
Certainly by the decade of the 1990s, law schools were
overwhelmingly instrumentalist in their understanding and
presentation of the law. 49  No longer was it particularly
noteworthy to include considerations of policy and social
purpose in your presentation of a course, it was more or less
expected.5 °  Standard casebooks, and even popular
commercial outlines, by this time included a very significant
amount of policy rationale. Rare was the article published by
a prestigious law review that did not delve deeply into the
social goals and consequences of the legal doctrine under
consideration. At least within the world of graduate law
schools, we were pretty much all realists now.51
Even though instrumentalism has become the dominant
perspective within law schools and in the academic literature
of law, it is still, as a newly emerging paradigm, relatively
young.52 While it may not be quite the revelatory journey
that it seemed fifteen or twenty years ago, many students
still come into first-year law school courses harboring
expectations about the determinacy and the mechanistic
nature of legal rules.53  Much of the popular culture,
especially in depictions of the operation of the criminal law,
conveys at least an implicit message of objectivity and
traditional formalism.
48. See Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal
Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 93-94 (2003) ("The law of torts, of contract, of
property are now largely conceptualized in these instrumental terms both
within academia and within the profession.").
49. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV.
469, 469 (1991) ("Legal realism has dominated American legal education for
over half a century.").
50. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 101 ("An instrumental view of law is
so taken for granted today that it rarely evokes comment, but in the 1960s and
1970s its novelty in legal education was recognized and prompted expressions of
concern.").
51. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467,
467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
(1986)) ("All major current schools of thought are, in significant ways, products
of legal realism. To some extent, we are all realists now.").
52. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 118 (identifying the 1960s and 1970s
as the period during which instrumentalism came to have its full impact on
legal theory).
53. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 145 ("Students entering law school
often think that law consists of 'black letter' rules.").
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More significantly, political actors at the highest levels of
government continue to espouse the most deterministic
version of formalism. These kinds of pronouncements
typically take center stage during the nomination and
confirmation of federal judges, particularly United States
Supreme Court justices. For example, in 2005, when
nominating Samuel Alito to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, President George Bush said, "He has a deep
understanding of the proper role of judges in our society. He
understands that judges are to interpret the laws, not to
impose their preferences or priorities on the people."54 Chief
Justice John Roberts in the opening statement of his
confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary said, "Judges and justices are servants of the law,
not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires
don't make rules; they apply them."5
As recently as last year, Erwin Chemerinsky, chaired
Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University,
made reference to this when he spoke at a symposium
entitled, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century.56
Professor Chemerinsky decried the continued persistence of
formalist rhetoric to describe the nature of judging and the
process of judicial review.57 He concluded his presentation by
saying, "we should abandon the misleading rhetoric of
discretion-free judging and talk about judging as it actually
54. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Nominates Judge
Samuel A. Alito as Supreme Court Justice (Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.Whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/2005/1031.html. In his
opening statement to the Senate hearings for his appointment, Justice Alito
said, "The judge's only obligation, and it's a solemn obligation, is to the rule of
law. And what that means is that in every single case the judge has to do what
the law requires." Transcript, Judge Alito's Opening Statement, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2006, at A18. A poll of the public at large conducted during the
confirmation hearings for Justice Alito found that sixty-nine percent believed
that the personal views of a Justice should not have a role in their decisions.
Poll, Americans Undecided on Alito, CBS NEWS, Jan. 9, 2006,
http'J/www.CBSNews.com/stories/2006/01/09/opinion/polls/main 192317.shtml?
source=search-story (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
55. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Robert, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
56. Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1081 (2006).
57. Id.
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occurs."
58
Perhaps one reason for the dominance of
instrumentalism in law schools and among legal academics is
that for a certain generation of legal academics the shift away
from formalism is still clearly remembered. Or it was tacitly
absorbed in the mix of instrumentalist and traditional
formalist professors that they encountered in law school.59
For these individuals, the energy of the realist critique may
still be vivid, and the notion of turning a critical eye on
instrumentalism itself seems somehow retrograde, an
expression of a possible yearning for, or defense of, a now
discredited and old fashioned formalist past.
Younger faculty members were most likely schooled by
professors who were themselves nearly all enthusiastic
instrumentalists and who, outside of a possible jurisprudence
elective, may not have wished to spend class time self-
consciously identifying and justifying their instrumentalist
approach to the material.6 0  The dominant, if implicit,
message to these students was that the only meaningful way
to understand legal doctrine was through an appreciation of
how that doctrine advanced certain social values and
disfavored others. 1
III. THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
What is it that legal scholarship attempts to do? What
work does it perform? For the purposes of this article, three
distinct functions of legal scholarship can be identified. The
58. Id.
59. See Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical
Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689, 732 (1968) ("At least in the better law schools,
'functionalists' and 'realists' are no longer lonely aliens in a hostile world. In
truth they probably outweigh in influence, if not in numbers, the
Langdellians.").
60. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 247-48 (1978). In 1978, the Dean of the
Cornell Law School wrote that instrumentalism had become, "the ordinary
religion of the law school classroom." Id.
61. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 471 (1993) ("Both legislators and courts are told that their work is
essentially a process of balancing interests. [Roscoe] Pound's social interests
are statements of objectives; decision turns on choice from among competing
grounds of policy. The wise judge or legislator will try to shape the system of
rights, duties, and remedies to attain the maximum satisfaction of social
interests.").
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first is to describe the history and the current state, and to
monitor the future development of, legal doctrine. This could
be called a primarily descriptive function. The second is to
evaluate the degree to which existing doctrine, and proposed
new doctrine, expresses and advances the optimal set of legal
principles in a given area and to suggest possible
improvements. This can be called a primarily normative
function. The third is to serve the needs of the practicing bar
and the legal academic profession. This can be called a
primarily service function.
In a formalist environment, these three functions operate
in close harmony.62 The classic legal analytical skill of
inducing general principles of law from the resolution of
discrete cases, and the deductive application of general
principles to the resolution of new cases, is the fundamental
unifying intellectual competence.63  It is thought to be
principally practiced by the courts, especially the appellate
courts, and it is generally described and explained in
descriptive legal scholarship.' It is critiqued and refined in
normative scholarship. It is modeled for the practicing bar in
publications and it is taught to law students in law school
courses.
One of the defining conceptions of the formalist paradigm
is the central role occupied by traditional legal analysis.65
62. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY chs. 9 & 10
(1994).
63. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 460 ("To support the prevailing image that
judges did not make law, but only applied law, lawyers combined Langdell's two
beliefs that law was a science and that principles, once discovered, were
perpetually valid, with Holmes' theory that liability should be limited to
objective injury . . . . Judges believed they were scientists who objectively
discovered the right decision by applying the proper underlying principles to the
objective facts of harm.").
64. See SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 140 ("Blackstone held that judges do not
make law, they only search out and discover it." (citing SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (William G.
Hammond ed., 1890))); see also Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The Theory and
Politics of Postmodernism: By Way of an Introduction, in POSTMODERNISM AND
SOCIETY 1, 13-16 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990).
65. Leiter, supra note 35, at 1145-46 ("[W~e may characterize formalism as
the descriptive theory of adjudication according to which (1) the law is
rationally determinate, and (2) judging is mechanical. It follows, moreover,
from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons
suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is
demanded or required.").
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Given this centrality, the role of law professor is
characterized in large part by an expertise in this
distinctively legal analytical skill.66 This expertise is brought
to bear in understanding and describing the work of appellate
courts, in critiquing that work and in offering suggestions for
improvement, and in conveying this essential skill to
succeeding generations of lawyers.
Under this conception, the professional role of law
professor is largely coherent and consistent. She has
developed a level of expertise and a facility in fundamental
legal analysis that is brought to bear and expressed in her
scholarship, in her teaching and in her service to the
practicing bar. Her authority to credibly engage in each of
these activities arises from her possession of this essential
expertise.67
While the standard portfolio of professional activities
engaged in by professors of law has changed very little over
the last 100 years, the understanding of the nature of these
various activities has undergone profound transformation in
the shift from formalism to instrumentalism. At the core of
these changes is the deep loss of faith in the independence
and determinacy of legal analysis occasioned by the success of
the legal realist critique.6" This was accompanied by a
66. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 38 (George Edward White ed.,1983) ("A
teacher of law should be a person who accompanies his pupils on a road which is
new to them, but with which he is well acquainted from having often traveled it
before. What qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law, is not experience in the
work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in
the trial or argument of cases, not experience, in short, in using law, but
experience in learning law." (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell)).
67. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 57-58 ("The legal elite - leaders of the
bar, judges, and academics - shared a confluence of interests that contributed to
a united front: Collectively they resisted the growth of legislation in the late
nineteenth century and they distanced themselves from instrumentalism in
legal practice, while promoting the view of law as science .... Legislation
threatened the autonomy of the common law and the power of judges who
controlled it, and disrupted the domain of legal academics as the leading
expositors and rationalizers of legal science .... All three agendas were thus
served simultaneously by maintaining the non-instrumentalist portrayals of
law as a matter of principle, reason, immemorial customs of the community, a
body of specialized knowledge and a science. The prestige and autonomy of one
was the prestige and autonomy for all.").
68. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 78 (2004) ("The Realists argued that there were gaps and
contradictions in the law, that rules often had exceptions which allowed for
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consequent decline in the previously held consensus that
general rules of law, and many of the specific results in
discrete cases generated by the application of those general
rules, were the logically mandated product of largely objective
legal analysis.69
This essential change in the perception of the nature of
legal analysis, and thus also the status of its products, has
been occasionally reflected, but by no means widely publicly
acknowledged, by the courts.7 ° Despite the realist revolution
and its full acceptance by most law professors, the
overwhelming majority of published trial court memoranda
and appellate court opinions in this country continue to
present themselves in traditional formalist terms. While
perhaps not as aggressively deterministic in tone as fifty or
seventy-five years ago, the written published products of our
courts, with relatively few exceptions, continue to offer their
holdings as the result of a distinctive legal analysis and not
an explicit balancing of social costs and benefits.7 This fact
can easily be lost on modern law students, and some faculty
as well, because the relatively small number of published
appellate court opinions that do engage in open
instrumentalist analysis are often widely noted, frequently
celebrated and become perennial inclusions in law school
casebooks.72
contrary outcomes, that there was flexibility when judges formulated the rule
purportedly laid down in a previously decided case, that many rules were
ambiguous, that when going from a general rule to application in a particular
case there could be more than one reasonable alternative, in sum, that the
interpretation of rules was often indeterminate, anything but mechanical, and
open to choices and subject to influence from the values of the judge.").
69. See id.
70. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 99
(1975) ("[The courts.., are caught between two roles with conflicting demands:
the role of the traditional formalist judge, who asks what the correct
interpretation of rules of law is, and the role of the calculator of efficiencies, who
seeks to determine what course of action will most effectively serve a given
goal.").
71. See Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 193 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002) ("It is true that judges sometimes cast their deliberations into
something resembling this form [a deductive syllogism], and that they thereby
(sometimes) exhibit their decision as deducible from a legal rule along with
another fact-stating premise. But this is an irrelevancy which should have
fooled no one into thinking that judges purport to access their judgments
deductively.").
72. As a long time teacher of tort law, my favorite example is Tarasoff v.
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Of course, judges issuing binding and authoritative
judgments in actual cases face powerful practical incentives
to present their decisions in largely formalist terms.7 3 They
may be justifiably concerned that an explicitly
instrumentalist presentation of their analysis and conclusions
would risk a lessening in the respect granted to their
decisions by the parties in the instant case.74 Moreover, they
may fear that an explicit and widespread embrace by the
courts of the instrumentalist paradigm would eventually
result in a serious questioning of, and ultimate challenge to,
the legitimacy of their authority.
On the other hand law professors, at least as legal
scholars, face no such practical impediments to embracing the
greater accuracy of the realist account and the
instrumentalist paradigm that flows from it, and they have
done so with vigor.75  This, however, has created an
interesting and potentially troublesome situation for legal
scholarship. Now legal scholars are addressing, as both
realists and instrumentalists, legal texts, at least those
produced by courts, which offer a predominately formalist
perspective.76  A critical distance, a breach, now exists
between the approach to legal issues adopted by the legal
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see also Peter F. Lake,
Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 97 (1994) ("[Tarasoff] is one of the single
most celebrated cases in the recent history of American tort law. Virtually
every lawyer who has taken a basic course in torts since the late 1970s knows of
the case."); see generally Scordato, supra note 23.
73. SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 149-50 (describing the use of legal fiction by
formalist judges to maintain the appearance of adherence to existing
precedent).
74. Regarding the legal reasoning set forth in most appellate opinions, John
Dewey had this to say more than eighty years ago:
It is at this point that the chief stimulus and temptation to mechanical
logic and abstract use of formal concepts come in. Just because the
personal element cannot be wholly excluded, while at the same time
the decision must assume as nearly as possible an impersonal,
objective, rational form, the temptation is to surrender the vital logic
which has actually yielded the conclusion and to substitute for it forms
of speech which are rigorous in appearance and which give an illusion
of certitude.
Dewey, supra note 34, at 24.
75. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
382 (1973).
76. See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 410 ("Owing to the fact that judicial
opinions are frequently suffused with rhetoric, it is invariably very difficult to
figure out what types of concerns lead judges to reach the decisions that they
do.").
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scholar and the approach presented by the courts-a distance
that did not exist under the formalist paradigm, even when
the scholar may have disagreed with the specific conclusion
reached by a particular court.77
IV. DESCRIPTIVE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE POST-REALIST
PERIOD
A. First-Order Descriptive Legal Scholarship
What, then, becomes of descriptive legal scholarship in
this post-realist world? One type of descriptive legal
scholarship that remains largely unaffected by this change is
a kind of first-order, or primary, descriptive scholarship that
attempts to more or less uncritically report on the results of
appellate court cases and the substance of statutes and
regulations.7" This kind of descriptive scholarship typically
sets forth the facts, the holdings, and the court's analysis of a
case, or of a series of cases in a given subject area, without
attempting to offer an independent explanation of why the
courts decided the cases as they did.79
This kind of first-order descriptive legal scholarship can
be conducted largely in the same way under either a formalist
or an instrumentalist paradigm. One important difference,
however, is in the degree of relative prestige that it is likely
to be accorded. In a formalist world, such scholarship is
thought to not only be recording the published public
rationale that a court provides for its decision, but also to be
describing the critical chain of analysis and reasoning that
was employed by the court and that is likely to be a powerful
77. See Gary Ahrens, Book Review, 21 JURiMETRicS J. 437, 438 (1981)
(reviewing PHILIP SHUCHMAN, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (1980)) ("The effects of laws and legal institutions on society can
be neither deduced nor induced from an analysis based exclusively on the
statements of the legal system's operatives; in other words, legal scholars who
devote their attentions solely to case opinions, statutes, and administrative
rules cannot reliably know the underlying facts and circumstances that the
cases, statutes, and rules purport to reflect.").
78. Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and
Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (2002) ("Huge
portions of legal scholarship as practiced in the academy are devoted to the
routine tasks of lawyers. Nothing that we say or write here will, or should,
alter the brute fact that much academic scholarship services the internal
operations of the legal profession.").
79. Id.
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guide to predicting the court's decisions in this area in the
future.0
In a post-realist world, however, the formalistic analysis
that a court provides for its holding is understood to
frequently be an inadequate explanation for the court's
decision to embrace one logically possible conclusion over
others.8 " At the heart of realism lies the belief that many, if
not most, interesting cases cannot be definitively resolved
through the purely logical application of existing precedent
and generally accepted legal principle. 2 Therefore, a class of
descriptive legal scholarship that primarily summarizes-and
perhaps even attempts to systematize-the courts' own
justifications for their holdings in a particular area almost
necessarily fails to provide a satisfying account of the
underlying jurisprudential dynamics.8 3
Thus we have the inexorable logic of the sharp decline in
prestige accorded to this kind of first-order descriptive
80. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1314,
1316 (2002) ("The task of the legal scholar was seen as being to extract a
doctrine from a line of cases or from statutory text and history, restate it,
perhaps criticize it or seek to extend it, all the while striving for 'sensible'
results in light of legal principles and common sense. Logic, analogy, judicial
decisions, a handful of principles such as stare decisis, and common sense were
the tools of analysis.").
81. FELIX S. COHEN, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, in THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 77, 81-82 (Lucy
Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) ("Judicial opinions have been viewed as no more and
no less reliable than the statements in which octogenarians, golf champions, or
successful bankers explain their achievements.").
82. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 26 ("The only foundational belief shared by
the realists was their common skepticism about the claims of legal formalists.
What united and defined the legal realist movement was the criticism it raised
about the formal style of modem jurisprudence."); ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 75 (1998) ("Antiformalism in law is at
the foundation of legal realism."); see also Leiter, supra note 35, at 1147 n.30
("Realists were certainly antiformalists, but this way of describing Realism
obscures the fact that Realists shared a positive view about what goes on in
adjudication.").
83. See Schauer, supra note 35, at 513-14 ("Thus, one view of the vice of
formalism takes that vice to be one of deception, either of oneself or of others.
To disguise a choice in the language of definitional inexorability obscures that
choice and thus obstructs questions of how it was made and whether it could
have been made differently."); Harold D. Lasswell & Myers S. McDougal,
Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 368 (1971) (suggesting
that traditional legal scholarship, "is exhausted by the description of patterns in
authoritative myth, without systematic investigation of the degree to which
they are in fact controlling.").
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scholarship in the current post-realist environment. 4 Just
twenty years ago when I began teaching law full-time the
authors of the major treatises in the great areas of common
law-Prosser,"5  Corbin,86 Williston,87 Wigmore 8 -were still
venerated. 9 No longer. 90 Now most anyone who tries their
hand at serious legal scholarship knows that, short of
"incompetent," the worst thing that can be said of their work
is that it is "merely descriptive."91
B. Second-Order Descriptive Scholarship
Thus descriptive legal scholarship in the post-realist era
is pushed to engage in what could be called second-order
descriptive scholarship. Here the scholar may begin with a
first-order description of the cases in a given area, but then
84. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and
Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 628 (2003)
("[LIegal writing whose audience is lawyers is simply not considered
scholarship.").
85. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941).
86. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1963).
87. SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931).
88. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (John T.
McNaughton rev. 1961).
89. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 151 ("Writing a treatise was the peak
achievement of a legal academic.").
90. See George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The
Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437 (1983) ("Today,
authorship of the legal treatise has been cast off to practitioners. The treatise is
no longer even a credit to those competing on the leading edge of legal
thought."); Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J.
1149, 1151 (1981) ("The aspiration that drove the traditional treatise - to locate
the quintessential legal rules and principles - was, at the least, deflated by the
realist attack.").
91. See generally KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930) ("[Flinding
out what the judges say is but the beginning of your task. You will have to take
what they say and compare it with what they do. You will have to see whether
what they say matches with what they do. You will have to be distrustful of
whether they themselves know (any better than other men) the ways of their
own doing, and of whether they describe it accurately, even if they know it.");
see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional
Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 166 (2006) ("If there was any uncontroversial advice for an
ambitious young law professor, it was to stay away from doctrinal scholarship
that is 'merely descriptive.'"). In his book of advice on writing law review
articles and notes, aimed primarily at law students, Prof. Eugene Volokh
includes among the list of "Topics and Structures You Should Generally Avoid.
• .Articles that just explain what the law is." EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC
LEGAL WRITING 28-29 (2003).
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she must go on to try to provide an account of what is really
motivating the design and development of doctrine in this
area.
92
1. Exposing the Indeterminacy of Formalist
Presentations
However, legal scholarship that does little more than
demonstrate that a court's formalist explanation for its
holdings in a given case fails to provide an adequate account
of its actual decisions and pronouncements can expect a
rather cool reception in the current environment. Such
scholarship, while consistent with the prevailing
instrumentalist paradigm, simply lacks a receptive
audience.94
For legal academics, the basic realist critique of
traditional formalism is well accepted and well known.9 The
majority of active law professors have been exposed to
repeated demonstrations of the critique on formalist texts in a
variety of subject areas while in law school.96 To publish yet
another illustration of the point in the context of a newly
92. See Cohen, supra note 5; Dewey, supra note 34; Joseph William Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25
(1984).
93. See VOLOKH, supra note 91, at 28 (listing first among "Topics and
Structures You Should Generally Avoid" in designing a law review article,
"Articles that show there's a problem but don't give a solution.").
94. DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 468 (observing that by the decade of the
1990s, "critical legal studies seemed rather moribund").
95. Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank are frequently identified as the two
central figures in the emergence of legal realism. White, supra note 25, at 1017.
Other prominent realists include Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, Leon
Green, Joseph Hutchinson, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, Max Radin and
Hessel Yntema. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5; Cook, supra note 33; LEON
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Joseph C. Hutchinson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q.
275 (1928); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980);
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); Max Radin,
LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1940); Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis
of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (1931).
96. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
395 (1950). Karl Llewellyn's classic statement of common law indeterminacy,
published in 1950, demonstrates that some, perhaps many, of the maxims
contained within the common law were potentially in direct contradiction with
one another. Id.
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issued opinion, or a series of opinions, is hardly revelatory,
and is unlikely to be enthusiastically received. After all, how
many times can a legal scholar perform essentially the same
realist critique on case after case in a given substantive area
of law before the work becomes stale?
Even in the law school classroom, the repeated
demonstration of the underlying indeterminacy of formalist
explanations for court decisions brings rapidly diminishing
returns, and for an interesting reason. In her role as a
teacher and in her work with the practicing bar, a law
professor faces very real pressure to maintain and to reinforce
a legitimizing attitude towards the law.97 After all, law is an
active professional discipline that continues to be conducted
in traditional formalist terms, despite the larger intellectual
revolution produced by the realists.9" This is especially true
in trial and appellate court practice.
A perusal of briefs submitted to appellate courts quickly
makes it clear that the current dominant presentation to
appellate courts, both state and federal, continues to involve
invocation of statute or case precedent using more or less
traditional legal analysis and standard logic to persuade the
court to adopt the party's preferred outcome.99 Again, the
tone of these presentations may be less severely deterministic
than they were half a century ago, and more of them may
explicitly advance instrumentalist arguments, however the
great majority of them are unmistakably rooted in an
implicitly formalistic conception of appellate process."'
97. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91
MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2111 (1993) ("[Tlhe scholars are still walking the tightrope
between frankly speaking truth to the powerful and adopting enough of the
discourse and conventions of the powerful to have some influence in their
world.").
98. See William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal
Academy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175, 181 (2001) ("[It has always been part of the
mission of American universities, and especially law schools, to prepare people
for worldly roles. These roles are entrenched in politics.").
99. Copies of thousands of appellate court briefs, filed in both state and
federal court, can be found in the Westlaw research service in the Briefs
Multibase and in the LexisNexis research service in the Briefs, Motions,
Pleadings and Verdicts database.
100. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 48, at 84 ("The pretense of decision compelled
by reference to principle may be a necessary pretense in such [difficult
appellate] cases, but it is, I think, absurd to believe, as our legal culture asserts
and purports to believe, that there are correct answers in hard cases,
discoverable through reason.").
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Because the practice of law, especially before courts and
other tribunals, is an active practical discipline that
continues in large part to operate, at least on the surface, in a
traditional formalist mode, and because law schools are
involved in expensive professional education that promises
students preparation to successfully engage in that
professional practice, 1°' enormous implicit pressure exists to
present the substance of legal doctrine to students, especially
in core law school courses, from a largely formalist
perspective. 10 2 Thus, while a law professor would certainly
want to expose her students to the realist perspective and to
illustrate it on one or two actual cases, it is simply not, in this
environment, a very effective presentation to students
learning a legal subject for the first time to continue time
after time to subject the appellate cases in the casebook to
one variation or another of the standard realist critique. 10 3
Once the point is made and illustrated a time or two that
courts are frequently disingenuous in the deterministic
manner in which they explicitly justify their holdings, there is
not much more to say. One can introduce and explicate what
is obviously the professor's own understanding of the social
101. See Vijay Sekhon, The Over-Education of American Lawyers: An
Economic and Ethical Analysis of the Requirements for Practicing Law in the
United States, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 778 (2007) ("[Tlhe average tuition at
private law schools in 2003 was $25,584. The average tuition for public law
schools was $20,171 for non-residents and $10,820 for residents. Assuming
graduation from law school in three years, the average cost of a law degree for a
private law student in 2003 was approximately $76,752; for a non-resident
public law student, $60,513; and for a resident public law student, $32,460."
(citing John A. Sebert, Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 35 SYLLABUS 4
(2004))); LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAw STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC
SERVICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND
FORGIVENESS 9-11 (2003) (reporting that tuition increased at private law
schools by 76% between 1992 and 2002 and by 134% at public law schools),
available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/lrap/downloads/lrapfinalreport.pdf.
102. See Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 389 (1990) ("In the classroom, law
professors face powerful incentives to present legal doctrine and legal processes
as being fundamentally rational, coherent, and consistent with current notions
of sound public policy.").
103. See Carrington, supra note 14, at 227 ("The professionalism and
intellectual courage of lawyers does not require rejection of Legal Realism and
its lesson that who decides also matters. What it cannot abide is the embrace of
nihilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and principle nothing but
cosmetic. Persons espousing the latter view, however honestly held, have a
substantial ethical problem as teachers of professional law students.").
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choices presented in the field, and then compare and contrast
competing views while marching through existing legal
doctrine announced by appellate court decisions that have
already been exposed as somewhat disingenuous. 0 4  This is
hardly an uplifting intellectual experience for students
encountering the study of law for the first time. 10 5
For example, let's assume that a scholar of corporate law
was convinced from her years of study that the mechanisms
that generate legal doctrine in that area had been
substantially captured by corporate management interests
and that nearly all of the current rules, from the business
judgment rule to the waivability of the duty of loyalty, to the
regulation of executive compensation, reflect a grossly unfair
favoring of management interests over the interests of every
other corporate constituency. While it would certainly be
appropriate for the scholar to introduce this idea to the
students in her introductory corporation law course, it would
be tedious indeed for all of the doctrinal material to be
presented exclusively from this perspective.'06
It would be not only tedious but ineffective, since one of
the obligations of the professor teaching such a course within
the context of professional education is to prepare the
students to operate effectively in the current legal
environment.0 7 This includes helping law students to become
104. In the field of literature, this is sometimes referred to as the problem of
the unreliable narrator. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION 158-
59(1961).
105. Carrington, supra note 14, at 227. ("The nihilist teacher threatens to rob
his or her students of the courage to act on such professional judgment as they
may have acquired. Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does, result
in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation. In an
honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist teachers are more likely
to train crooks than radicals.").
106. No corporation law or business associations casebook of which I am
aware comes close to doing this, though they may include some occasional
references to such a perspective.
107. ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., Bylaws and Executive Committee Regulations
Pertaining to the Requirements of Membership, in 2005-2006 HANDBOOK, §§ 6-7,
available at http'//www.aals.orgfabout-handbook-requirements.php ("A
member school shall maintain as its central academic feature a program of
resident study and instruction leading to a Juris Doctor degree, the first
professional degree in law. The school shall have a program of appropriate
duration and rigor to assure its graduates have a comprehensive understanding
of legal institutions and an appreciation for the role of law and lawyers in
society, and that they are academically qualified to participate effectively and
responsibly in the legal profession.").
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conversant with the conventional wisdom and the body of
generally accepted principles and arguments currently at
play in the field, even if the professor is personally convinced
that much of it serves as a kind of legitimizing myth.1 08
This would be somewhat analogous to a professor of
medicine in a traditional university medical school who
became persuaded over time that a combination of
unorthodox alternative therapies, such as homeopathy,
herbal treatments and massage, was a far more effective
response to a variety of illnesses than those offered by
traditional scientific medicine. 1°9 This faculty member might
pursue these beliefs in her research and her writing, and she
could well turn out to be objectively correct in many respects,
but she should not be featuring these alternative theories in
her course in internal medicine to medical students. 110 She
need not pretend to her students that she has full faith in the
current conventional understanding and techniques of
internal medicine, but she is nevertheless obliged to
competently and thoroughly expose her students to them."'
This is part of the nature of professional education and the
role of a teacher in a professional school." 2
108. See generally Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L. J.
1153 (1970) (noting the strong tradition of moral neutrality in legal education).
109. See Jennifer Huget, Earning a Spot in the Curriculum, WASH. POST,
July 17, 2007, at F1 (reporting on the degree to which medical schools have been
incorporating into their curriculum information on complementary and
alternative medicine).
110. See Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Stuck in a Rut: The Role of
Creative Thinking in Problem Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLINIcAL L. REV.
835, 868-69 n.96 (2003) ("Technical rationality' was Donald Schon's term for
'substantive' knowledge, the body of scientific work or doctrinal knowledge on
which a profession is supposedly based. In medicine, that is what the medical
school curriculum calls basic science.").
111. See Daniel B. Hinshaw, Remarks at Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law
School Curriculum (July 27, 2001), in Models from Other Disciplines: What Can
We Learn from Them?, 1 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 165, 175-76 (2002)
(transcript of afternoon session available at
http://www.alwd.org/publications/pdf/ErasingLines-Plenary2.pdf) ("What is the
shape of the medical school curriculum? . . . Standardization is extremely
important. Every practitioner should come from a common educational
foundation .... The medical curriculum is filled with many required courses,
both in the basic sciences and the clinical clerkships. There are relatively few
electives .... By the end of the second year of the medical curriculum, medical
students are required to pass the U.S. Medical Licensure Exam Step I, which
covers the basic sciences, before they can progress into the clinical years.").
112. See Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392,
421 (1971) ("Most of professional training, by its very nature, demands the
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It can be seen, then, that when legal scholars engage in
the act of describing legal processes and the substance of legal
doctrine, which activity takes place primarily when they
teach law students in law school, they do so within a context
of professional education that more or less compels them to
present the procedures and the doctrine as coherent, rational
and largely aligned with the conventionally understood public
good (or at least seeking in good faith to achieve a reasonable
version of that public good)." 3 They face this pressure year
after year, semester after semester, in every core law school
course that they teach. Moreover, as noted above, continued
repetitions of the basic realist critique in their scholarship, or
repeated illustrations of it on newly produced cases and
statutes, is unlikely to generate much positive response."4
This powerful dynamic exists completely irrespective of
whether or not such a view of the law and legal processes is
an accurate and true account.
Thus one can come to appreciate that the shift from a
generally accepted formalist paradigm to the current post-
realist instrumentalist paradigm has created a subtle but
profound separation between the law professor's role as a
legal scholar and her role as a law school instructor and
service provider to the bar."5 In the former role, the scholar
seeks to understand the nature of law and legal processes and
to state what is true as she sees it." 6 In the latter two roles,
she is often obliged to abandon the more cynical or radical
aspects of her understanding in an effort to help students and
practitioners work effectively within the existing faiths and
conventional understandings of the current system.
This tension comes most clearly to bear in the case of
first-order descriptive legal scholarship. While not much
acquisition of large amounts of cognitive data. This learning task is essential to
professional competence and does not allow for instant creativity.").
113. See Simon, supra note 98, at 176 ("Since the advent of the modem legal
academy, it has been an article of faith among its leaders that law is
fundamentally different from politics. At points, a virtual loyalty oath to this
effect was required.").
114. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93; infra text accompanying note
170.
115. See generally Scordato, supra note 102, at 376-79.
116. See Robert B. McKay, Ethical Standards for Law Teachers, 25 ARK. L.
REV. 44, 47 (1971) ("A teacher should, in his own scholarship or other public
statements, maintain the highest standard of dispassionate search for truth...
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respected by other legal scholars who have absorbed the
realist critique and thus do not see a summary of courts' own
words as adequately explanatory, this kind of formalist work
is still quite valuable to students and to practicing members
of the profession who must, regardless of their personal
views, successfully navigate in these waters."7
2. Accurate, but Cynical, Explanations for the Substance
of Legal Doctrine
This tension is also prevalent in another particular kind
of second-order descriptive legal scholarship. This is the kind
of descriptive scholarship that seeks to accurately describe
what it is that is motivating the choice of legal doctrine
without the uncritical reliance on the published words of the
decision makers, and without necessarily accepting that the
motivating factors are tied to the furtherance of public values
and the public good. Take for example a legal scholar who is
interested in finding out why a certain provision exists as it
does in the Internal Revenue Code.118  After substantial
research, she is convinced that the provision in question was
included in the Act by its sponsors in large part because it
would generate substantial benefits for the timber industry
and that the senator from a large timber producing state
absolutely insisted on its inclusion as a condition of her
critically needed support for the bill. Is this the kind of
descriptive analysis of the provision that would be highly
valued if offered by the legal scholar in a published article?
Most likely not. Such an explanation for the existence of the
provision, even if entirely realistic and accurate, is simply not
particularly relevant to, nor very useful in, the practice of the
profession of law.119
117. One can appreciate this point by simply browsing through the current
catalogs of major law book publishers. A very significant percentage of the
volumes they offer is comprised of first-order descriptive legal scholarship and
teaching materials. See generally Westlaw Home Page,
http://west.thomson.com; Lexis Nexis Bookstore Home Page,
http://bookstore.lexis.com; Michie's Legal Resources Home Page,
http://www.michie.com.
118. I.R.C. §§ 1-2000 (2007).
119. And not, apparently, in the academic study of tax law either. Should
you doubt this, simply spend thirty minutes perusing the shelves of the tax
alcove in the nearest law school library. I did this at four different law school
libraries located in Washington, DC, each associated with a major research
university. Overwhelmingly, and unsurprisingly, the shelves are full of
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To further illustrate this point, imagine an entire treatise
on tax law that painstakingly traces similar practical political
reasons for the existence of the various provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code. Such a book might make for
interesting background reading but it would be of very little
sustained usefulness to a practicing attorney, a law student
or even a legal scholar. It is certainly not what most persons
seeking out a treatise on tax law would be looking for. 120
As these examples illustrate, it should be understood that
legal scholarship, even predominately descriptive legal
scholarship, is not seeking the kind of disinterested objective
description of reality that one might associate with a natural
science like physics or chemistry. I do not mean by this that
there are sociological forces within the community of legal
scholars that influence the award of benefits and the
allocation of grant funding so that at a given time some ideas
and theories may be advantaged over others, as might well
occur in the fields of physics or chemistry. 121 I mean instead
volumes designed to aid in the actual practice of tax law. I observed not a single
title that in any way suggested that the book included explanations of the
presence of various provisions of the tax code of the sort suggested here.
120. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 9-27 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing the policy and philosophy
underlying tax law treatise). Again, a perusal of the table of contents and the
introductory chapter of most any current tax law treatise, or a popular law
treatise in any substantive doctrinal area for that matter, will make the point.
See e.g., id. at ix-xxxiii. Hopkins identifies six basic rationales for qualification
of tax-exempt status, including a political philosophy rationale that occupies an
entire section of the book. Id. at 12-21. However, the very first rationale that
he identifies is that, "a nonprofit entity is exempt because Congress wrote a
provision in the Internal Revenue Code according exemption to it. Thus, some
organizations are exempt for no more engaging reason than that Congress said
so." Id. at 10. There is little doubt that there exists some specific reason, a
possibly quite interesting story, of why and how each of these provisions came
to achieve the status of federal law. There is also, however, equally little doubt
that Mr. Hopkins, the author or coauthor of twenty books in this area, is correct
in his judgment that such explanations are not an important part of the reason
that readers seek out this treatise. Id. at ix.
121. See John Raisian & William O'Keefe, Foreword to POLITICIZING
SCIENCE: THE ALCHEMY OF POLICYMAKING, at vii -ix (Michael Gough ed., 2003)
("Scientists, eager to continue their research, are influenced to propose research
that they judge is most likely to obtain government funding. Others elect to
pursue funding from regulatory agencies, possibly thinking that results and
conclusions that support instituting or expanding of regulations may be more
likely to be rewarded with continued funding. Political-scientific interactions
are part of the modern world."); see also ALAN FRANCIS CHALMERS, WHAT IS
THIS THING CALLED SCIENCE? 104 (1976) ("In many respects, the production
and appraisal of scientific knowledge is a complex social activity."); JEROME R.
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that broad vistas of accurate description of the making of law
and its implementation are simply of little value within the
realm of legal scholarship, such as the tax treatise
illustration above.
Legal scholarship operates within the context of an active
and practical complex of social systems in which authoritative
law is created, maintained and applied to discrete cases with
outcomes that have serious consequences for individuals.
There are, as with any such complex social system, important
conventions and shared understandings that play an
important role in making the system operate reasonably well:
Existing law is largely coherent and rational; on the whole, it
seeks to further important social values; those who
administer the law and make critical decisions are,
overwhelmingly, striving to be fair and impartial and are
competent at performing the function.122 Descriptive legal
scholarship, no matter how accurate and true, that constantly
challenges and contests these working assumptions is simply
not very useful, and it is, as a practical matter, not much
valued in our current environment.123
As a final illustration of this point, imagine that a series
of newspaper articles reveal convincingly that a large
percentage of the trial and appellate judges currently working
in a given city regularly accept bribes from lawyers practicing
before them and regularly respond to the receipt of these
RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 81 (1971) (stating
that scientific knowledge is "achieved by a complex social endeavor").
122. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378
(William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (1958) (arguing that the
legislative purpose behind a statute should be determined by, "a court trying to
put itself in imagination in the position of the legislature which enacted the
measure .... The court, however, should not do this in the mood of a cynical
political observer, taking account of the short-run currents of political
expedience that swirl around any legislative session. . . .It should assume,
unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. . . .It should
presume conclusively that these persons, whether or not entertaining concepts
of reasonableness shared by the court, were trying responsibly and in good faith
to discharge their constitutional powers and duties.").
123. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 2105 ("[Tlhe dominant tone of scholarship
is one of earnest high-mindedness about the legal system, a sustained and
rather mystifying optimism. If anything, in my view, it is all much too soft-
edged and sunny, far too sparing of the dark and bitter realities of legal
institutions and the social worlds in which they work.").
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bribes by ruling in these lawyers' favor.124  What could
reasonably be done with this in the realm of legal
scholarship? An article detailing the various ways in which
attorneys who are so inclined are able to identify judges who
may be receptive to bribes and the methods by which the
bribes can be successfully covertly transferred and the
corresponding benefits assured? An article suggesting ways
in which opposing counsel might come to suspect that the
judge in her case is being bribed by opposing counsel? A
scrupulous review of the existing precedent in that
jurisdiction that could be the product of this tainted process?
Not likely.125 The only plausible bit of legal scholarship that
is likely to emerge from such revelations is an article
outlining the various rules of judicial conduct and criminal
law that are likely to have been violated by this conduct and
124. While the hypothetical is intentionally exaggerated to make a larger
point, a recent article in the Los Angeles Times, on judicial corruption in Las
Vegas, suggests that it may not be as much of an exaggeration as we might
hope. See Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They're
Playing with a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-vegas8jun08,1,7420641.story. In
any case, instances of individual judges accepting bribes in exchange for
influencing the outcome of litigation is hardly unknown. See, e.g., Michael
Brick, Brooklyn: Ex-Judge Ordered to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at B6
(reporting on the conviction of a former State Supreme Court Judge, Gerald
Garson, who was convicted of accepting bribes to manipulate the outcome of
matrimonial cases in his Brooklyn court). Very recently, a well known and
successful personal injury attorney was indicted on federal conspiracy and
bribery charges for allegedly offering a judge $50,000 to influence the outcome
of a fee dispute. Nelson D. Schwartz, Court Intrigue for the King of Torts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, at C1.
125. A search conducted on the Westlaw research service on July 30, 2007,
revealed only eleven law review articles with any of the words "judge,"
"judiciary" or "judicial" and either of the words "bribe" or "corruption" in the
title. Four of these articles are not concerned with the possible bribing ofjudges
at all and simply happen to have the target terms in their title. Four of the
articles appear in international law journals and are not focused on the United
States. One is a very short synopsis of a book that contains the target terms in
its title. This means that among the vast number of law review articles
currently available on Westlaw, only two, by the evidence of their titles, deal
directly with the possibility or the fact ofjudicial corruption in this country. See
Thomas M. DiBiagio, Judicial Corruption, The Right to a Fair Trial, and the
Application of Plain Error Review: Requiring Clear and Convincing Evidence of
Actual Prejudice or Should We Settle for Justice in the Dark?, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
595 (1998); Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and
Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1231 (1997). As it turns out, these two articles
were published in consecutive years and both are reactions to the same incident
ofjudicial misconduct. See id.
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the professional disciplinary and criminal procedures that
will come into play in their enforcement. 
126
This same response by legal scholars could be expected,
and can been observed, to reports of significant misconduct by
legislators in the crafting of statutory law. 127 One can read a
great deal of legal scholarship focused on statutory acts,
statutory schemes and various theories of statutory
interpretation without encountering much sustained
attention to the role of sophisticated lobbyists, special
interests, logrolling or earmarking in the formation of that
legislation, or the implications of such routine legislative
influences on the possible interpretation of the resulting
law. 28 Descriptive legal scholarship, at least thus far, is work
126. See, e.g., James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of
Misconduct, 30 NOVA L. REV. 349 (2006) (discussing the penalities available for
judicial misconduct, the factors used to determine the appropriate penalty, and
the goal of punishment); Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial
Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243 (1993) (exploring the circumstances in which
informal and quasi-disciplinary mechanisms are used, how well they work and
setting forth proposals to improve or modify their operation).
127. See, e.g., Philip Rucker, Former Senator Pleads Guilty to Racketeering,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2007, at B2 ("Former Maryland state senator Thomas L.
Bromwell pleaded guilty Tuesday to federal racketeering and tax crimes,
admitting that he used his influence as a lawmaker to benefit a prominent
contractor in exchange for secret payments of more than $190,000."); Editorial,
Mr. Jefferson Indicted; Prosecutors Allege He Took Much More Than the $90,000
Seized from His Freezer, WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at A16 ("To read the
indictment of Rep. William J. Jefferson is to wonder how, if the allegations are
true, the Louisiana Democrat, so busy soliciting and dispensing bribes, had any
time left over for his day job.").
128. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
14, 20 (1994) ("Traditional legal writers have no theory of legislatures in general
or of enacting coalitions in particular. Without such a theory statutory
archaeologists lack a methodology for linking up their approaches with
democratically legitimate expressions of preferences by the legislature, an
unruly and incoherent group.").
I do not mean to say here that legal scholars and legal scholarship have
failed to notice that lobbyists, special interest groups, logrolling and earmarking
are a regular part of the legislative process. Certainly not. But most of the
focus of such attention, when it occurs, is in service to considerations of the
optimal set of legal regulations for the legislative process itself, as in public
choice theory. See, e.g., NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 84-100 (1997). Attention to such aspects of
legislative lawmaking is not much present in the field of statutory
interpretation, even in those schools of statutory interpretation that seek to
identify the reasons why the legislature actually adopted the law, because such
factors, no matter how practically influential they may have been, are simply
not helpful to the practical professional task of interpreting and applying the
statute. ESKRIDGE, supra at 19-21 ("To the extent that conventional intent is
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that overwhelmingly seeks to explain and to understand the
law from the perspective, and within the working context, of
the legal profession.'29
C. An Alternative Approach to Second-Order Descriptive
Legal Scholarship
1. The Basic Strategy
Given these various tensions, one can see that a different
kind of second level descriptive scholarship can be imagined
that might satisfy both the intellectual demands of realism
and the more practical demands of students, attorneys and
judges. Moreover, this kind of descriptive legal scholarship
would fit perfectly within the traditional jurisdiction of the
legal scholar. Such second level descriptive scholarship
would attempt to depict existing doctrinal law in a given area
as the expression of an underlying, even if unarticulated, set
of social goals or principles.
Thus, for example, the common law rules regarding the
tort law cause of action of negligence are described as being
designed to encourage efficient, but not excessive, levels of
precautionary investment. 130  Traditional contract law
doctrine is described as being designed to maximize beneficial
reliance. 131  Property law doctrines dealing with private
nuisance are described as being designed to place the burden
created by agents trying to push legislation through the chamber, one would
expect those sources to be singularly unhelpful for the issues typically at stake
in the 'hard cases' (Ronald Dworkin's term) of statutory interpretation.").
129. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 2112 ("[Llegal scholarship is still
primarily the earnest and high-minded work of legal improvement. Most
scholars continue to assume that the managers of the legal system want the
system to work justly and efficiently and to serve its best purposes; and that
when deficiencies are pointed out, and rational arguments made for
amendment, concerned lawyers will respond with dialogue and collaborate in
the reform effort, if necessary even against their own and their clients'
immediate interests.").
130. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (providing
economic analysis of the rules of tort law).
131. See, e.g., L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 62 (1936) (discussing traditional contract
doctrine and stating, "[tihe juristic explanation in its final form is then twofold.
It rests on the protection accorded the expectancy on (1) the need for curing and
preventing the harms occasioned by reliance, and (2) on the need for facilitating
reliance on business agreements."); Goetz, supra note 44.
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of precaution upon the least cost avoider. 131
This kind of second level descriptive legal scholarship
masterfully combines an implicit rejection of precedent based
logical formalism in a way that satisfies the demands of
realism with a wholehearted embrace of the ultimate
rationality, coherence and purposefulness of the law that is
more or less demanded by the legal scholar's professional
role. 33 The product of such an approach can be enormously
complicated and sophisticated; it can avoid almost all taint of
cynicism regarding the legal system and it can promise to its
readers a potentially powerful guide to the likely future
judgments of appellate courts.
In addition, such an approach to legal scholarship
typically substitutes some set of general standards-
efficiency, economic productivity, deterrence, compensation,
risk spreading, beneficial reliance-for the traditional legal
maxims and generalized statements of legal principle of the
formalist paradigm, and then works out an explanation for
the broad array of doctrine in a particular subject area by
deductively reasoning from these new first principles.'34 In
this way, legal scholarship of this sort enjoys the satisfying
appearance of objectivity and logical inevitability that was
thought to be the hallmark of formalism in its heyday while
still appearing to be consistent with post-realist perspectives.
It is little wonder then that such scholarship has flourished,
and perhaps can fairly be said to have dominated the field
during the past forty or fifty years. 35
132. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(arguing that actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others are
problems of "reciprocal nature" and "[tihe real question that has to be decided
is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?").
133. See Francesco Parisi, Introduction: The Legacy of Richard A. Posner and
the Methodology of Law and Economics, in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW, at i, xviii (Francesco Parisi ed., 2000) ("One of the
leading themes of law and economics is that the common law process generates
efficient rules .... The efficiency hypothesis has become an important focal
point among law and economics scholars. The efficiency hypothesis suggests
that the common law . . . is the result of an effort, conscious or not, to induce
efficient outcomes.").
134. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (applying the principles of law and economics
to common law torts, formulating tort laws designed to maximize efficiency and
comparing the results to existing laws); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); POSNER, supra note 132.
135. See BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 177 (Sweet &
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2. The Problem of Verifiability
Descriptive scholarship of this sort makes a most
remarkable claim. It purports to discover retrospectively the
real, genuine, internal calculus of decision-making employed
by courts in creating and refining common law over hundreds
of years, when the courts that actually produced this vast
body of doctrine were required to explain their decision-
making process in writing and made relatively scant, if any,
mention of the general standards and principles that it is
suggested they were pursuing all along.136 The existence of
unconscious processes of this sort exerting such a strong and
systematic influence upon a particular individual's outward
behavior may seem plausible after Freud,137 and one can also
imagine a specific public decision maker being less than fully
candid about the reasons for coming to a given conclusion, but
the claim is quite hard to accept when it is generally applied
to the professional work of thousands of appellate court
judges operating largely independently over hundreds of
years. 138
Furthermore, as a descriptive effort, it is difficult to know
just how the claims of such legal scholarship could be
definitively refuted. 39 It hardly seems fair to such work to
Maxwell, Ltd., 2d ed. 1999) ("In the United States, no approach to law in recent
decades has been more influential than the economic analysis of law .... It
dominates thinking about antitrust law, tort law, and most commercial law
areas. Even areas of the law which would seem uncongenial to economic
analysis, like domestic relations (family law), criminal law, and constitutional
law (civil liberties), have had significant contributions by law and economic
analyses. There seem to be no domains free from attempts to apply this
approach.").
136. See Fiss, supra note 9, at 8 ("Judges do not see themselves as
instruments of efficiency, but rather as engaged in a process of trying to
understand and protect the values embodied in the law.").
137. See SIGMUND FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 34-39 (James
Strachey trans., 1949); SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS 104-12 (Walter J.H. Sprott trans., 1933); see also HENRI F.
ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1970).
138. See Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand
Formula," 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 181 (2003) (characterizing Richard
A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 133, as consisting of, "overbroad
generalizations, unsupported and even implausible assumptions, and
conclusory statements.").
139. See George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970,
973 (1981) ("[I]f the Supreme Court declares the meaning of the Constitution,
we might question the political wisdom of the decision, but one could hardly say
that the Court's statement was true or false. The Court cannot declare what
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say that it is somehow wrong and discredited because not all
of the traditional legal doctrine in a given area conforms to
the suggested general principles.14 ° Surely it still remains a
remarkable thing to be shown just how much of the common
law of torts, contracts and property conforms to the
expectations and predictions of law and economics, even if
every last doctrine, or even some significant segments of a
particular body of law, does not do so.
But to judge this kind of work as important and valuable
on this basis, as it unquestionably is, is to acknowledge that it
is not descriptive analysis in the usual, traditional academic
sense.14 ' Unlike an attempt, say, to describe a natural
phenomenon, 4 2 the failure of this kind of legal scholarship to
explain the presence of three or four visible characteristics
and to be unable to precisely predict the response of the object
of study to certain stimuli is apparently not fatal to its
perceived value as a descriptive thesis.
143
This kind of second order descriptive legal scholarship
does not claim to offer a complete and accurate explanation
for the common law in any given substantive area, and thus
the Constitution means and at the same time make a mistake about the true
meaning of the Constitution.").
140. See ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM
HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM 75 (2005) (commenting on
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 133, "[h]ad courts openly proclaimed
their economic intentions, Posner's approach might have served him well. But
this was not the case. Of the over 1500 appellate cases Posner examined, none
explicitly adopted an economic analysis of negligence."); Fiss, supra note 9, at 3
("The efficiency hypothesis always seemed weak. The evidence marshaled has
not been wholly convincing; the exceptions seemed almost as important as what
purported to be the generalization, and although a story might be told as to how
a particular rule . . . served efficiency, it also seems possible to tell a similar
story about the opposite rule.").
141. See Alex C. Michalos, Philosophy of Science: Historical, Social and Value
Aspects, in A GUIDE TO THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MEDICINE
222-50 (Paul T. Durbin ed., 1984).
142. See, e.g., DAVID EISENBERG & WALTER KAUZMANN, THE STRUCTURE AND
PROPERTIES OF WATER (2005) (1969).
143. Karl Popper is generally credited with recognizing and emphasizing the
critical role of falsification in the development of descriptive science. See KARL
RAIMUND POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (2d ed. 1965); see also WILLIAM BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE 33-34 (1988) ("A scientist should begin by making hypotheses about
how the world is and then seek to disprove them. If the hypothesis is disproved,
then it should be discarded .... True scientific theories are ones that can be put
to critical tests where we can specify in advance what would count against the
theory.").
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its failure to fully account for all aspects of the doctrine under
examination, or to predict all future movements in the law,
should not significantly diminish its importance or its
value.'" It is not, then, like a descriptive account of the
physical communication among bees in a hive,'14 5 or the
movement of stars and planets. 146  There is not really an
expectation that further research and discovery will result in
the refinement of a unified set of principles that can fully
account for all of the law of contract, or torts, or property.
147
Nor is there really any prospect of additional data being
revealed that will somehow definitively refute these kinds of
descriptive theories. 48 That traditional tort law doctrine can
be characterized as advancing values like economic efficiency,
or risk spreading, or corrective justice, is interesting and
important even if it is thought that such descriptions do not
fully and completely account for all of the existing doctrine.
141
144. See Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant, The Economics of
Contracts and the Renewal of Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS:
THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 26 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds.,
2002) ("The difficulty of formulating testable propositions is only one of the
problems encountered when testing theories of contracts."); OLIVER HART &
BENGT HOLMSTROM, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC
THEORY: FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 71-155 (Truman Bewley ed., 1987)
(expressing regret at the absence of empirical verification of the economics of
contracts).
145. See THOMAS D. SEELEY, THE WISDOM OF THE HIVE: THE SOCIAL
PHYSIOLOGY OF HONEY BEE COLONIES (1995).
146. See GEORGE W. COLLINS II, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STELLAR
ASTROPHYSICS (1989).
147. See Fiss, supra note 9, at 5; George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal
Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 973 (1981) ("Scientific theories are not built out of
claims about what is the 'sensible' or 'rational' thing for someone to do, but
instead require an identification or description of those observable features of
the environment that systematically lead people to behave the way they do
(regardless of what they say about their beliefs or anything else). That Posner
and his colleagues never provided .... The theory of 'sensible objectives' fails to
supply the explanatory mechanism needed to give the 'law is efficient'
hypothesis predictive validity, or even descriptive credibility.").
148. See Carl G. Hempel, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in READINGS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 384 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1970) ("The defining
characteristic of an empirical statement is its capability of being tested by a
confrontation with experimental finding, i.e., with the results of suitable
experiments or 'focused' observations. This feature distinguishes statements
which have empirical content both from the statements of the formal sciences,
logic and mathematics, which require no experimental test for their validation,
and from the formulations of transempirical metaphysics, which do not admit of
any.").
149. See Jack M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory
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If attempts to describe the law in this way are not like
descriptive efforts in the natural sciences, where the basic
measure of success is the degree to which the explanation
accounts for observable features and predicts future action,
then how should they be viewed? 150 On what basis can they
be evaluated? How should one determine if a descriptive
theory of this sort is improved by a suggested refinement?
There are at least two possibilities that can serve as
instructive examples. One is non-empirical descriptive work
in sociology and psychology. 15 Here, as in law, academics
look at complex human phenomena and attempt to describe
or to characterize them in a meaningful way.5 2 The work is
intended to offer important insights and perspectives on the
subject but does not set forth a verifiable, or refutable,
descriptive account. 153 The work of Sigmund Freud, for
example, is incredibly powerful and has been enormously
influential irrespective of whether it is, in modern scientific
terms, strictly accurate and true. 154 The same can be said for
of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1487 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)) (arguing
that an economic theory of the development of legal doctrines fails to accurately
capture the reality of judicial decision making).
150. See Michael Scriven, Explanations, Predictions, and Laws, in THEORIES
OF EXPLANATION 51-74 (Joseph C. Pitt ed., 1988).
151. See Herbert L. Costner, Theory, Deduction, and Rules of
Correspondence, in CAUSAL MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 229-50 (Hubert
M. Blalock, Jr. ed., 1985) ("Traditionally, sociological theorists have focused on
abstractions with loose and ill-defined implications about matters of fact.").
152. See Richard N. Williams, The Language and Methods of Science:
Common Assumptions and Uncommon Conclusions, in CRITICAL THINKING
ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 235-49 (Brent D. Slife, Jeffrey S. Reber & Frank C.
Richardson eds., 2005).
153. See THOMAS TEO, THE CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGY: FROM KANT TO
POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 32 (2005) ("From the perspective of human-scientific
psychology, the problem lies in what is considered the solution in natural-
scientific psychology: The conceptualization of psychology as a natural science is
the problem because it does not do justice to the specific subject matter of
psychology, and the unique, fundamentally and qualitatively different
relationship between researcher and research object in psychology and the
natural sciences.").
154. See SCOTT L. MONTGOMERY, THE SCIENTIFIC VOICE 361 (1996)
("Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis, reformer of Western concepts of
the individual, the family, and their deformations, is quite possibly the most
influential writer of the 20th century. No other author has had his ideas
permeate public sensibility to such a degree."); FRANK J. SULLOWAY, FREUD,
BIOLOGIST OF THE MIND: BEYOND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC LEGEND 500 (1979)
("Perhaps only Aristotle and Darwin have equated Freud's marriage of theory
and observation in the broad realm of the life sciences."); see also PETER D.
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the work of Carl Jung.155 Which is the superior account? By
what criteria should one go about answering that question?
156
Given the ways in which both thinkers have enriched the
culture and added to our insights into human psychology,
does this question have any real practical meaning?'57
Another, not inconsistent, but perhaps more
controversial approach to examining this kind of second order
legal scholarship is to treat it as being analogous to the
academic discipline of literary criticism.' Both disciplines
look at a large written canon and seek to comment
insightfully upon it. 5 9 Neither necessarily believes that only
the conscious intentions of the individual authors of the work
KRAMER, FREUD: INVENTOR OF THE MODERN MIND (2006); PETER GAY, FREUD: A
LIFE FOR OUR TIME (1988); see generally FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 136 (explaining the principle tenets upon which
psychoanalytic theory is based); SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961) (contending that civilization
is responsible for our misery).
155. See DEIRDRE BAIR, JUNG: A BIOGRAPHY (2003); MARIE-LOUISE VON
FRANz, C. G. JUNG: HIS MYTH IN OUR TIME (William H. Kennedy trans., 1998);
ELEANOR BERTINE, JUNG'S CONTRIBUTION TO OUR TIME (Elizabeth C. Rohrbach
ed., 1967); see generally CARL GUSTAV JUNG, THE ARCHETYPES AND THE
COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (Richard Francis Carrington Hull trans., 1959)
(purporting that the unconscious mind contains archetypes, universal mental
predispositions not grounded in experience and these archetypes arise
spontaneously in the mind, especially in times of crisis).
156. See SEYMOUR FISHER & ROGER P. GREENBERG, THE SCIENTIFIC
CREDIBILITY OF FREUD'S THEORIES AND THERAPY (1977); ADOLF GRUNBAUM,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE (1984).
157. See Percy Bridgman, The Operational Character of Scientific Concepts,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 67-69 (Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & John D.
Trout eds., 1991); N.Y. UNIV., PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCIENTIFIC METHOD, AND
PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM (Sidney Hook ed., 1960).
158. See Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2113, 2114
(2007) ("I suggest that despite the theoretical puzzles underlying [BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006)],
it possesses a thematic and emotional unity as a kind of legal dystopia. As
such, its contributions should be assessed by literary as well as theoretical
criteria."); see Paul D. Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1986) (noting, "the effort to apply the insights of
contemporary literary criticism to law").
159. See PAISLEY LIVINGSTON, LITERARY KNOWLEDGE: HUMANISTIC INQUIRY
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 6 (1988) ("Construed broadly, the literary
canon comprises a vast and extraordinarily rich body of symbolic artifacts. This
richness has to do, not with the movements of the comets, but with the
complexities and conditions of human experience."); WILLIAM E. CAIN, THE
CRISIS IN CRITICISM 255 (1984) ("It is difficult to imagine how the discipline can
function without a canon that is taught year after year; we have always
understood a select group of texts to be the nucleus of English, and it is an
intimidating task to explain what might serve as a substitute.").
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should control its appropriate interpretation. 160  The
identification and explication of overarching or underlying
themes in the cannon is highly valued.16 1  Counterintuitive
and novel insights and perspectives, if plausible, are also
valued highly. 162  Creativity and elegance of expression
matter. The degree to which a descriptive theory or insight
can thoroughly account for every aspect of the texts under
consideration matters little.'63 Empirical verifiability is more
or less irrelevant. 6
4
Like non-empirical work in psychology and sociology, and
academic work in literary criticism, the quality and value of
second-order descriptive legal scholarship will inevitably be
determined by a consensus of opinion in the relevant
community. 165  Beyond the very fundamentals, like logical
160. See Ann Jefferson & David Robey, Introduction, in MODERN LITERARY
THEORY 7-8 (Ann Jefferson & David Robey eds., 2d ed. 1991) (1982) ("What
writers think about literature in most cases has a limited bearing on the way in
which critics and scholars approach the subject. In dealing with a given author
literary studies have traditionally paid considerable attention to his views on
writing, but only as part of the 'background' to his work. These views have been
used to explain his motives or intentions, and to account for the peculiar
character of his texts, but on the whole they have not fundamentally affected
the way in which these texts, or those of any other author, have been treated.").
161. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 2105 ("Scholars aim to make structural
connections across practice specialties and doctrinal categories, for example to
show the commonalities of tort, contract, property, competition, and labor rules.
They aim to understand the structural and historical determinants of legal
policies and practices, to understand how these came to be the way they are.").
162. See Victor A. Kramer, Introduction, in AMERICAN CRITICS AT WORK:
EXAMINATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORIES 3 (Victor A. Kramer ed.,
1984) ("[So many contemporary critics and theorists keep celebrating the
complexity of texts which reveal more than we might suspect, or even
sometimes wish. This fact of surprise is basic to the critical act.").
163. See Raymond Tallis, Evidence-Based and Evidence-Free Generalizations:
A Tale of Two Cultures, in THE ARTS AND SCIENCES OF CRITICISM 71-93 (David
Fuller & Patricia Waugh eds., 1999) ("[T]he widespread and uncritical
acceptance of the evidence-free assertions of the founders of [modern literary
theory] is an extension of a much longer tradition of accepting evidence-poor
assertions ...the discrepancy between the scope of the general statements
made within literary and cultural studies and the minute size of the database
upon which such statements are founded is not new.").
164. See LIVINGSTON, supra note 159, at 15 ("It should be clear that we do
not presently possess any literary theories that fulfill such requirements
[empirical testability] .... To say that x's essay on y was a rigorous analysis
usually means that x said something incisive, that the essay was detailed,
careful, accurate, and so on.").
165. See HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 88 (1992) ("The knowledge filter produces consensual
knowledge, which is not the same thing as objective knowledge."); Patrick Colm
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consistency and clarity of expression, the value of scholarship
of this sort is in the degree to which it is considered
interesting and insightful-values that are both highly
contingent and perspective dependent.166  One can
consequently expect trends and countertrends, movements
and counter-movements. 167 Rarely, if ever, will work that is
considered truly important come from an unexpected
source. 161 Much of the basis for the evaluation of such work
will necessarily be aesthetic. 1
69
3. An Inevitable Bias
Given this, and given the larger legal culture within
which legal scholarship is produced and consumed, one would
expect that over time a strong preference would develop for
descriptive scholarship that seeks to show that longstanding
Hogan, The Political Economy of Criticism, in CRITICISM IN THE UNIVERSITY
178, 181 (Gerald Guff & Reginald Gibbons eds., 1985)(" [T]he application of a
literary theory cannot be said not to 'work' in the clear and straightforward
sense in which it can be said of the application of a theory of aerodynamics ....
There results a situation in which all literary critical adjudication is interested,
and interested in a way that truth or falsity is irrelevant to the fulfillment of
the interests in question.").
166. See MARIO AUGUSTO BUNGE & RUBEN ARDILA, PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 17-18 (1987) ("Indeed, philosophical psychology survives not only
in philosophy departments but also in the psychology community, though
marginally .... To be sure, occasionally one finds more interesting insights on
the human mind in the writings of armchair psychologists, or even writers of
fiction, than in many a rigorous but unimaginative experiment.").
167. See generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, FADS AND FALLACIES IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (2003).
168. See MAX STEUER, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF SOCIETY 26-27 (2003)
("There have been instances where someone outside the establishment has been
successful in championing an idea that initially ran counter to accepted
knowledge .... This is rare, but it can happen.").
169. See Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1113, 1122 (1981). Richard Posner noted:
Doctrinal analysis today is a humane rather than scientific discipline.
As in the other humanities, great emphasis is placed on writing well
(sometimes on writing impressively--which is not the same thing),
footnoting copiously, treating every topic exhaustively, and staying
within the linguistic and conceptual parameters of the doctrines being
analyzed. Soundness is valued above originality, thoroughness above
brevity; originality, where it is present, tends, indeed, to be concealed.
Id. For a very similar description of the appropriate evaluative scheme
to be employed in the academic field of philosophy, see JOHN PASSMORE,
PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING (Basic Books 1969) (1961); Friedrich M.
Waismann, How I See Philosophy, reprinted in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 345-
80 (Alfred Jules Ayer ed., 1959).
20081 THE NATURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
legal doctrine can be understood to implicitly embrace and to
promote important social values.17 ° For the same reasons,
work that seeks to demonstrate that a certain legal doctrine,
or doctrinal area, is logically incoherent, or often
inappropriately applied, or applied in a manner that is
inconsistent with its stated rationale, is not likely to be highly
valued, at least not for long.'71
In tort law, for instance, different value will be placed on
two articles addressing the special limited duty rules of
negligence applicable to the owners and occupiers of land. An
article that seeks to show that these rules advance efficient
use of real property would be thought to be a more
sophisticated and significant contribution than an article that
describes the rules as an incoherent mess whose primary
effect is to favor the economic interests of relatively wealthy
landowners over those who are physically injured on their
land.172 Similarly, an article or book that claims to identify
underlying, as-yet-unstated, principles that unify and make
sense of United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding the dormant commerce clause would likely be more
highly valued than a similar work whose main purpose was to
demonstrate that the existing cases lack convincing rationale
and cannot be logically reconciled.'73
Perhaps this difference in the prestige accorded to the
first kind of descriptive legal scholarship over the second
results from a widely held belief that the former is simply
more likely to be true than the latter, that long standing
common law doctrine most likely makes good sense at some
170. See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, at xliv (James Boyle ed., 1992) ("Perhaps
we should not start with the assumption that legal doctrine as it existed was
entirely correct and entirely legitimate, and then try to fashion a theoretical
cover which fitted the status quo like a slipcover on an overstuffed armchair.").
171. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory
after the Right's Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1205 (2007) ("In the conventional
wisdom, the critical legal studies (CLS) movement that stirred legal academics
from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s is dead .... ).
172. See Robert S. Driscoll, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its
Past, Present, and Some Considerations for its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
881 (2006); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 265, 313-33 (2006).
173. See, e.g., EDMUND W. KITCH, REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981); Donald Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
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level, and that the search for those underlying principles-
even when they are not articulated by the appellate courts
themselves-is a more valuable scholarly activity than a
purely negative critique of the doctrine. While possible, it
could be noted that such a bias is not normally thought to be
a virtue in other areas of academic work. 174  For example,
research into the efficacy and side effects of a new medicine
should not be considered more of a contribution to the
literature if the results confirm the value of the drug than if
the research uncovers previously unknown harmful side
effects and problematic interactions with other drugs.1 7
Interestingly, one can see a similar bias in the field of
literature. Work that attempts to uncover and explain
previously unrecognized levels of meaning and sophistication
in the works of a celebrated author, like Shakespeare, is quite
likely to be viewed as more valuable than work whose thesis
is that the author's use of symbolic images is in fact far less
coherent and rich than is generally supposed. Similarly, one
can suspect that both Freud and Jung have had a more
powerful and lasting impact on the broader culture than has
B. F. Skinner in part because their depictions of human
nature are so much more attractive and appealing than the
one offered by behaviorism." 6 This, despite the fact that
174. See STEUER, supra note 168, at 41 ("One would expect much of scientific
research to have the potential of furthering the generally accepted ends of the
society in which it takes place .... While being aware of the ever present, and
often hard to detect, influences away from objective results, social scientists
should and do aim to reduce the amount of bias in their work.").
175. See Andrew A. Toole, Does Public Scientific Research Complement
Private Investment in Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical
Industry?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 81, 85 (2007) ("[1]f a particular compound is shown to
be toxic or ineffective ... the knowledge gained about a compound's absorption,
toxicity, elimination, side effects, and efficacy may provide valuable information
to industry scientists. Using the specific knowledge gained from a publicly
supported clinical trial, industry researchers might investigate a modified
compound from the same chemical family or a modified dosage regime and find
a safe and effective drug."); see also Bernard Barber, The Case of the Floppy-
Eared Rabbits, 64 AM. J. SoC. 128 (1958).
176. See DANIEL W. BJORK, B.F. SKINNER: A LIFE, at xi (1993) ("To his most
fervent opponents, Skinner was the Darth Vader of American psychology,
perhaps even the Hitler of late-twentieth century science itself - a man whose
science of conditioning threatened the dearest humanistic traditions, indeed,
those that made life most worth living."). I visited three large retail bookstores
in the Washington, DC area in July 2007. On the shelves of these three stores
were an average of twelve different books authored by Sigmund Freud, nine
different books authored by Carl Jung and only one book at only one store
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Skinner's work has yielded far more in the way of empirically
verifiable predictions and results. 7
In the field of legal scholarship, the value of descriptive
academic work to judges, to practicing attorneys, and to law
students is simply much greater if it helps them to better
understand, to rationalize, and to manipulate existing legal
doctrine than if it describes that same doctrine as a product of
flawed logic, an inconsistent line of cases, or extra-judicial
social influences. This difference in the relative value of the
work to the bench, the bar and to law students is largely
independent of whether the one account or the other is
actually more convincing, or more accurate.1 78  Because the
necessary currency of the realm of daily practice before courts
is the fundamental rationality and reasonableness of existing
legal doctrine, sophisticated descriptive legal scholarship that
produces the consequence of legitimizing and rationalizing
existing law is considered more valuable, and is thus likely to
garner greater prestige, than more critical work, irrespective
of the likely underlying accuracy of the description. 179
authored by B. F. Skinner. Similarly, as of July 2007, the public library system
in Montgomery County, Maryland (adjacent to Washington, DC) carried in their
collection twenty-one books by Freud, sixteen by Jung and six by Skinner.
177. See LESLIE SPENCER HEARNSHAW, THE SHAPING OF MODERN
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1987) ("Within the limits of the rigidly controlled
experimental situations and the insulated Skinner boxes with which he works
he has undoubtedly produced convincing results . . ."); RICHARD EVANS, JUNG
ON ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY (1979) ("On the whole, American psychologists
found Jung's work too mystical and philosophical to satisfy their criteria for
sound, scientific research. In fact, it is interesting to note that at that time,
Jung's ideas were more characteristically heralded by members of philosophy
and English departments in universities than by the inhabitants of psychology
departments."); see generally BURRKUS FREDERIC SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM
AND DIGNITY (1971) (arguing that our traditional concepts of freedom and
dignity are responsible for the futile defense of a presumed free and autonomous
individual and are blocking the development of more effective cultural
practices); BURRKUS FREDERIC SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM (1974) (setting
forth the general principles of Behaviorism, proposing that all things that
organisms do can and should be regarded as behaviors).
178. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 236 (arguing with respect to the
realist critique of formalism that, "[tihe threat to the rule of law posed by this
complex of ideas is not that judges are incapable of rendering decisions in an
objective fashion. Rather, the threat is that judges came to believe that it
cannot be done or that fellow judges are not doing it. This skepticism, if it
becomes pervasive among lawyers, judges, and the public, will precipitate a self-
fulfilling collapse in the rule of law.").
179. See Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1229, 1235-36 (1981) ("[Tlhe production of liberal scholarship is really
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4. Increasing Specialization and a Narrowing of Focus
Second order descriptive legal scholarship of the sort
described above is likely to share one further characteristic
with the field of academic literary studies, which is a
tendency towards increasing narrowness and hyper-
specialization over time.180 After all, the canon that is the
subject of study in each field, while not static, is relatively
stable and to some degree fixed. It has been the object of
scrutiny and examination in professional academic work for a
long time."' Significant additions to the existing body of
published material in each area are, therefore, most likely to
be found in smaller and smaller niches.18 2
For a scholar working in descriptive legal scholarship,
identification of a reasonably meaningful topic that has not
enjoyed sustained attention in the existing literature is no
easy task.8 3  Inevitably, that opening is more likely to be
found in a quite narrow or a highly specialized approach to
the subject." 4 For instance, imagine the enormous difficulty
faced by a current English graduate student who is told that
her dissertation must be on some aspect of the work of
Shakespeare. The same would hold true for a legal scholar
who is hypothetically told that her next professional article
must be on the doctrine of consideration in contract law. 8 5
part of the process of fashioning a legitimating ideology that makes the world
appear as if it were not the one we live in, that makes it seem legitimate ....
The process of delegitimating scholarship eventually reveals a world that is
characterized more by conflict than by harmony, and by patterns of illegitimate
hierarchy.").
180. See Carrington, supra note 157, at 12 (noting "the tendency of legal
scholarship to address ever smaller audiences of ever narrower experts.").
181. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Book Review, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 357, 361
n.19 (2000) ("It is far easier to write the thousandth law review article on a
subject than the first, or even the hundredth.").
182. See Erik M. Jensen, Food for Thought and Thoughts About Food: Can
Meals and Lodging Provided to Domestic Servants be for the Convenience of the
Employer?, 65 IND. L.J. 639, 639 (1990) ("Authors of law review articles search
long and hard for subjects in which no reasonable human being should be
interested; most succeed in their quest.").
183. See Dennis J. Turner, Publish or be Damned, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 550,
554 n.11 (1981) ("The lack of quality [of law review articles] is not surprising
when one considers the various techniques employed by professors in writing
articles. For example, the process of selecting a topic is often the 'what's left'
approach. This method entails looking over the field and picking out an obscure
issue that has not been the subject of a 60 page article.").
184. See Scordato, supra note 102, at 376-79.
185. Other publicly identified candidates for topics that have been heavily
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A number of consequences flow from this ever greater
narrowing of the focus and perspective of much of descriptive
legal scholarship. One consequence is that, over time,
significant energy is sapped from the enterprise. From an
academic perspective, we are now more than a half decade
into the paradigm shift from formalism to instrumentalism
occasioned by realism. The basic realist critique has been by
now frequently stated and restated and has been applied to a
wide variety of legal fields and materials. The most likely
instrumentalist accounts of nearly every area of legal doctrine
have been developed and reviewed and challenged. This is
not to say that more interesting and productive work in these
areas is not to be expected, but it does mean that the great
majority of the work now being done is primarily in the fine
stitching. 186
Perhaps as a result, a kind of cold-eyed careerism seems
to be pervasive in the legal academy, with the greatest
excitement and tumult being reserved for the annual
publication of law school rankings in U.S. News and the ever
increasing lateral movement of individual faculty members
among the more elite institutions. l17 It has been some time
analyzed in the legal literature include sovereignty in international law and
international relations, regulatory takings pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause and corporate charter competition. See Winston P. Nagan &
Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law
and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141 (2004); Carol M.
Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Richard Booth, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. McBride & Edward P. Welch, The
Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholars Perspective, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 88
(2000).
186. John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 317, 320
(1985) ("One of my favorite persons in the profession.., described to me how to
become a successful professor with a national reputation when I was a fledgling
professor. He said: 'Take an obscure little problem that no one has thought
much about, blow it out of all proportion, and solve it, preferably several times,
in prestigious law reviews."').
187. See William Henderson & Andrew Morriss, Rank Economics: Law
School Faculty Members Love to Hate the U.S. News Rankings, But for Law
Students, Job Prospects Rule, and U.S. News has Valuable Info for Them, 29
AM. LAW. 81, 81 (June 2007) ("As the importance of the U.S. News rankings
increases, so does the incentive to game the system. Law faculties may love to
hate the rankings, but they pay attention to them because the rankings affect
the enrollment decisions of law students and the happiness of alumni and
administrators. Unfortunately, some of the measures that some law schools
have taken to improve their status seem like the equivalent of using a
particularly dodgy tax shelter.).
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since a book or a law review article has been excitedly passed
from hand to hand and treated as virtually required reading
among law professors not working in that same subject area.
Though political affiliations may still matter, it appears that
no one with the right credentials and a sufficiently long list of
publications is any longer in danger of not being hired
because of their jurisprudential commitments.
A second likely consequence of this narrowing of field and
focus in descriptive legal scholarship is a reduction in the
attention that this work attracts in the larger culture, and an
attendant reduction in its general influence."' 8 The notice
and description of recently published academic work in
medicine, genetics, finance and psychology is commonplace in
the popular press and broadcast media. Not nearly so much,
if at all, with legal scholarship, despite the law being, at least
on its face, a far more practical and accessible subject.8 9 This
also despite lawyers and legal processes being the focus of
countless dramatic programs on television and the consistent
and sustained coverage that specific legal cases receive in
broadcast and print news. 190
Id.; see also Leigh Jones, Fall Forecast: Top Law Schools Ready for Flood of Job
Changes, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2007, at 19 ("[Almong the top 15 or so [law] schools,
rampant raiding for tenured faculty is under way, with the schools ranked the
highest by U.S. News & World Report -- often the same group with gargantuan
endowments -- feeding on those below them. Moreover, shuffling is more
frequent among professors at the very top schools as they trade places between
Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Stanford and NYU.")
188. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992) ("[I]t is my
impression that judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little
use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the
academy."); see generally Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in
Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990) ("The lead articles
themselves are often overwhelming collections of minutiae, perhaps
substantively relevant at some point in time to an individual practitioner or two
way out in the hinterlands - and that almost entirely by chance. Otherwise
they are relegated to oblivion, or if luck to a passing but see in someone else's
obscure piece.").
189. See Daniel M. Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media
Marketplace, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1759 (2002) (review essay) ("With so many
outlets, cable networks are hungry for content. Legal materials fill that need.").
190. See TIMOTHY 0. LENZ, 7 CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM &
TELEVISION CRIME STORIES (David A. Schultz ed., 2003) (arguing that because
images of popular legal fiction are ubiquitous, such programs can shape and
affect viewers' opinions of criminal justice); ELAYNE RAPPING, LAW AND JUSTICE
AS SEEN ON TV (2003) (describing the changing tide of the way lawyers are
depicted on television programs); PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS
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This current relative lack of influence, perhaps even
relevance, of descriptive legal scholarship on the larger
culture may well extend to the practicing parts of the legal
community itself.191 Very recently, a group of federal judges
speaking at a symposium made it quite clear that they find
very little value in current legal scholarship. 19 2 An account of
the conference in The New York Times included the following:
'I haven't opened up a law review in
years,' said Chief Judge Dennis G.
Jacobs of the federal appeals court in
New York. 'No one speaks of them. No
one relies on them.' In a cheerfully
dismissive presentation, Judge Jacobs
and six of his colleagues on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit said in a lecture hall jammed
with law professors at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law this month that
their scholarship no longer had any
impact on the courts.'93
This narrowing and specializing of descriptive legal
scholarship also causes greater conflict between a law
professor's role as a legal scholar and her role as a teacher of
law students.1 94  In core law school courses, students are
generally introduced to the subject matter of the course, led
through a broad survey of the legal doctrine in the area and
exposed to at least" the conventional understandings, theories,
controversies and open questions in the field. The approach
to the material that is likely to be most effective in
LEGAL NARRATIVE (Robert M. Jarvis & Paul R. Joseph eds., 1998) (examining
the way lawyers are portrayed in television dramas and comedies); THOMAS
LEITCH, PERRY MASON: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO FILM AND TELEVISION
SERIES (2005).
191. See Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of Law Reviews: Refinement and
Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2006) (noting that much legal
scholarship is never used); William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student
Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News
Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163, 192-93 (2006) (describing legal scholarship as
being little noticed and having only a minimal impact on a law schools'
reputation ranking).
192. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are Finding Law
Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8.
193. Id.
194. See Scordato, supra note 102, at 376-78.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
performing this teaching function is not likely to be fertile
ground for productive professional scholarship, and vice
versa. 195 Put slightly differently, the legal scholar who would
be understandably dismayed to be told that their next article
must be focused on the doctrine of consideration nevertheless
must guide their first year contract law students to a full
understanding of that doctrine, and must do so semester after
semester, year after year.
A further effect of the continual flow of published insight
and commentary on the same basic body of materials and the
consequent difficulty of identifying promising ground to work
is that scholars facing such a situation are likely to
aggressively search for ways of expanding the definition of
the field. In the past thirty years we have seen a virtual
explosion in interest and resources devoted to international
and comparative aspects of law.196 The same has occurred in
the area of interdisciplinary work. 97 While neither of these
phenomena can reasonably be said to have been caused by
the pressure of scholarly demands, both trends are entirely
consistent with a strong need to expand the field of scholarly
inquiry.
Another strategy that legal scholars can employ to find
fresh topics for study is to move quickly to examine any newly
produced legal materials. It is now rare for as much as six
months to pass before formal scholarly analysis has begun to
appear regarding any significant decision issued by the
United States Supreme Court. Editors of law reviews have
195. Id. at 376.
196. See Steven R. Smith, A Remarkable Period in International Scholarship:
Thirty Years Before the Masthead, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 209, 209 (2000); Diane
P. Wood, Diffusion and Focus in International Law Scholarship, 1 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 141, 141 (2000) ("[Tlhere are well more than seventy international law
journals already being produced in the United States alone."); see generally
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, What's Wrong with International Law Scholarship?:
International Legal Scholarship at the Millennium, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 85, 91
(2000) (categorizing international legal scholarship as "a rapidly expanding and
developing field.")
197. See Posner, supra note 80, at 1316 ("What was new was the number and
density of the external approaches that began to take hold in the legal academy
around 1970 and the number and seriousness of their practitioners. I shall call
the new approaches "interdisciplinary," in contrast to the "doctrinal"
scholarship that until then had the field of academic law pretty much to itself.");
see generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
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noted that the submission cycle following the issuance of a
highly anticipated Supreme Court opinion will inevitably
include dozens of articles discussing that case.
On the whole, this rapid responsiveness to new legal
developments can be thought to be a positive feature of legal
scholarship. Some less attractive features, however, can also
be identified. One is that the rapid response to, for instance,
a new Supreme Court case, can be thought to largely occupy
the field. Aside from a scholar who possesses an already well
established reputation and can enjoy the luxury of extended
reflection, the great majority of law professors know that they
must quickly produce an article discussing that case. If their
article is not included in the next submission cycle, they run
the risk that law review editors will have already seen the
earlier submissions, will have either chosen one themselves
or assumed that other reviews have, and will view the case as
having already received sufficient treatment. 198 This dynamic
is likely to result in less thoughtful and less insightful
published commentary on many of the most important legal
cases than might otherwise have been produced, an ironic
result given that few people look to law reviews for breaking
legal news.
A second even less attractive feature of an environment
that encourages an aggressive competitive leap by scholars to
rapidly analyze and discuss important new legal
developments is that this pressure, combined with the
natural incentive to enhance the apparent significance of the
article, will cause scholars who are examining a new
phenomenon or development to make more of it than perhaps
it is. 199 Consequently, under such conditions one might expect
major trends to be spotted, highlighted and advanced on a
rather modest, perhaps even an inadequate, basis .200 Thus,
198. Posner, supra note 80, at 1321 ("Think . . . how mind-numbingly
repetitious are the hundreds of articles on Roe v. Wade, now to be eclipsed it
seems by a veritable avalanche of articles, most saying the same things, about
Bush v. Gore.").
199. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution:" The
American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 8 (1986) ("Student editors prefer
pieces that . . . deal with topics that are either safe and standard on the one
hand, or currently faddish on the other.").
200. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law
and Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403, 403 (2004) ("[T]he steady stream of innovations in legal
scholarship might be taken to be indicative of an almost unseemly striving after
403
404 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
one sees the rapid rise and eventual decline in the visibility of
doctrines that with greater reflection may not have possessed
that much potential from the start.2"1 Just in the area of tort
law, both market share liability2" 2 and hedonic damages 20 3
come to mind as possible examples.
V. NORMATiVE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE POST-REALIST
ERA
Does the picture for legal scholarship brighten when one
turns from a consideration of descriptive scholarship to a look
at normative legal scholarship? Normative scholarship is
meant here to describe legal scholarship that purports to
evaluate the relative quality or attractiveness of a legal
doctrine or that advances a preferred legal treatment of a
given problem or issue. Of course, a given work of legal
scholarship may combine elements of the descriptive and the
normative in the same way that it may combine first-order
fads and fancies.").
201. See Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 307, 309 (1986) ("[Alrticles defending the status quo are much less
likely to be published than articles attacking the status quo. The more sensible
a legal rule, the less will be published supporting it, while articles cleverly
attacking it often will be taken as brilliant insights. Thus, the law review
literature will be dominated by articles taking silly positions, while the sensible
positions held by most law professors usually will be underrepresented.").
202. Compare Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation
Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 680 (1981) ("In Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, the California Supreme Court led the nation's courts in removing
unjustified obstacles in the path of strict products liability. The Sindell decision
appears cast in the same mold"), with Daniel J. Grimm, Accounting for Risk
Disparity: An Alternative to Market Share Liability, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
549, 553 (2006) ("Plaintiffs advancing market share liability theories beyond the
DES context have largely failed. Market share liability has been rejected in
litigation involving asbestos, cigarettes, breast implants, benzene, and toxic
chemicals.").
203. Compare Andrew Jay McClurg, It's A Wonderful Life: The Case for
Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 113
(1990) ("The thesis of this Article has been that life has intrinsic value that
should be recognized in tort law."), with Reuben E. Slesinger, The Demise of
Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort Litigation, 6 J. LEGAL ECON. 17, 25 (1996) ("It
appears that the various attempts by economists, abetted by other social
scientists, to introduce hedonic damages into testimony has run the course. At
best, it had a short life of about 10 years"), and Victor E. Schwartz & Cary
Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1037, 1043 (2004) ("Most courts do agree, however, that 'expert' testimony
on hedonic damages has no place in the courtroom and that hedonic damages
are not available in wrongful death or survival actions.").
2008] THE NATURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
description with second-order description, but the distinction
remains meaningful.2 °4
A. Formalist and Quasi-Formalist Models
Under a formalist paradigm, there is not much difference
in the basic analytical approach that a scholar would be
expected to take when engaging in either descriptive or
normative work. Both would be grounded on an application
of traditional, precedent-based, facially logical legal
analysis.2 °5 For example, a legal scholar working in the
formalist tradition who is examining a particular appellate
court opinion might begin by describing the formalist analysis
set forth by the court. She might then evaluate the
soundness of the court's analysis and critique it, offering
suggestions for improvement in the future treatment of the
issue. The primary tool employed by this scholar in pursuing
this work, either the description of the court's analysis or her
own evaluation of it, is traditional legal analysis, looking
primarily to existing precedent and principle and applying
inductive and deductive logic to generate conclusions.2 6
Because the essential intellectual skill used in this work
is traditional legal analysis, it seems both appropriate and
inevitable that it be the professional work of law professors.
This is the central intellectual skill that they were taught as
204. See Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light?, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
627, 658 (2006) ("There is widespread agreement that scholarship should be
both descriptive and normative. . . ."); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being
Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 814 (1999) ("It is at least hoped that empirical
scholarship can more easily separate the normative from the descriptive and
better maintain neutrality. Of course, this remains just a hope.").
205. Leiter, supra note 35, at 1145 ("Pure formalists view the judicial system
as if it were a giant syllogism machine, with a determinate, externally-
mandated legal rule supplying the major premise, and objectively 'true' pre-
existing facts providing the minor premise. The judge's job is to act as a highly
skilled mechanic with significant responsibility for identifying the 'right'
externally-mandated rule, but with little legitimate discretion over the choice of
the rule.").
206. Cox, supra note 48, at 69 ("The formalist adjudicative theory thus
depicted entails a deductive procedure. It is deductive in the sense that a rule
as a major premise and a set of facts as a minor premise generates a right
answer."); Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy,
and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 309 (2003) ("Formalist arguments are
deductive in nature, and conform to the structure of a syllogism of deductive
logic: the rule of law is the major premise, the facts of the case are the minor
premise, and the legal result is the conclusion.").
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students in law school and that they now teach their students
in law school courses. The universe of materials required by
the legal scholar working within a formalist paradigm is all
more or less readily available in the law library. °7
This basic approach to normative work is substantially
the same for that class of post-realist scholarship that
functionally substitutes a defined set of abstract values and
goals for formalist precedent and principle as described above
in Section IV.C.1.208 The scholar starts with the assumption
that a fundamental goal of legal doctrine in a given area is, or
should be, the pursuit of certain conditions, such as the
maximizing of efficiency in a way that will support increased
economic productivity." 9 Or the scholar begins with the
assumption that the law should seek to achieve fundamental
fairness, or social justice, or to maximize human dignity,
defined in a particular way.210 The evaluation of existing
legal doctrine is then based on an analysis of how well it
performs the defined function, and suggestions for change are
all based on ways in which it could more effectively achieve
the identified goals. 1
So long as the set of values that are used to substitute for
precedent and conventional legal principle are sufficiently
abstract, this kind of analysis can look very much like
traditional formalism.212  It is distinctive enough, and
sufficiently engaged in the analysis of primary legal
materials, to feel that it rightly belongs in the province of
207. See RICHARD C. ALLEN, ELYCE ZENOFF FERSTER & HENRY WEINHOFEN,
MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 4 (1968). As late as 1968,
legal research is described as, "still largely doctrinal; carried on within the
paneled walls of law libraries by lawyers and judges, who presumably feel that
no discovery can more effectively shape the law of tomorrow than what has been
said by other lawyers and judges about yesterday." Id.
208. See Fiss, supra note 9, at 5 ("The aim of this second, or normative,
branch of law and economics is not to describe or explain how decisions were in
fact made or predict how they will be made, but rather to guide them....
According to this branch of law and economics, the normative concepts of the
law should be construed and applied in such a way as to make the judicial
power an instrument for perfecting the market.").
209. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV.
757, 761-65 (1975).
210. See, e.g., ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW (1997).
211. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452-53, 462-66, 481-82 (1974).
212. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
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legal scholars.213  The definition and refinement of the
substitute values used in this type of work are typically
borrowed from other academic disciplines, such as economics
or moral or political philosophy, and are not traditionally part
of a lawyer's education, but most of what is borrowed is
abstract in nature and reasonably accessible. Still, as with
traditional formalism, the materials required by a legal
scholar doing this kind of work are all more or less readily
available inside the law library, or not far from it. 214
B. Normative Legal Scholarship within an Instrumentalist
Paradigm
1. The Fundamental Challenge
It is when one steps away from these highly abstract,
quasi-formalist approaches to legal scholarship, however, that
things quickly get much more problematic. Once the realist
critique effectively exposed and debunked the logical
determinism of formalism, at least for most academics, the
question as to what the basis should be for an appellate court
choosing one possible version of a legal doctrine over another
was effectively reopened. For example, on what rationale
should a court decide that a therapist either does or does not
have a formal legal duty to warn another of the possible
danger posed by a patient?215 On what analysis should a
court determine that the tort law of that jurisdiction either
does or does not include a duty to affirmatively aid?216
As discussed in Section II, the alternative to formalism
that has thus far been accepted by most of the legal
community in this post-realist period can be called
213. See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 301-09, 312-13 (discussing
characterizations of law and economics as being a natural outgrowth of both
legal formalism and legal realism.).
214. See CALNAN, supra note 1, at 75 ("Posner argued that modern - that is,
nineteenth century - negligence law was premised on the concept of economic
efficiency. He did not support his thesis by examining the economic, social and
political environment of the time. Nor did he examine the intellectual
traditions of industrial-age judges. Indeed, he made no attempt to prove either
that efficiency was a dominant social norm or that judges were trained to think
in efficiency terms. Instead, Posner merely reviewed all American negligence
cases decided between 1875 and 1905." (discussing Richard A. Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, supra note 133)).
215. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
216. See Scordato, supra note 40.
407
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
instrumentalism.21 v Rather than viewing the common law as
seeking to develop over time an abstractly ideal set of legal
doctrines, a natural law, instrumentalism sees the law as one
of a collection of societal responses, or instruments, that can
be deployed to try to solve current problems and to achieve
desired goals.21 Thus the criminal law is seen less as the
abstract working out of a catalog of undesirable behaviors
that are philosophically deserving of formal societal sanction
and more as a social system, necessarily working in tandem
with other social systems, that seeks to reduce the occurrence
of certain kinds of behavior and their resultant harm.21 9
Far from being a slowly evolving and ever improving
body of bedrock legal principles and the more specific legal
doctrines that logically flow from them, as one might view the
ever more accurate and evolving body of scientific laws and
principles in a natural science like physics or chemistry,
220
law would be expected, from an instrumentalist perspective,
to readily change over time and across different jurisdictions,
sometimes dramatically, in response to changes in the
perception and prioritizing of current social needs and
goals.22' In this context, the measure of the quality of a given
217. Cf Vermeule, supra note 158, at 2113 ("[Tlhere is no such thing as
'instrumentalism.' There is only a variety of instrumentalisms, offered in
different theoretical contexts for different purposes.").
218. See Cook, supra note 33, at 247 ("Underlying any scientific study of law,
it is submitted, will lie one fundamental postulate, viz., that human laws are
devices, tools which society uses as one of its methods to regulate human
conduct and to promote those types of it which are regarded as desirable. If so,
it follows that the worth or value of a given rule of law can be determined only
by finding out how it works, that is, by ascertaining, so far as that can be done,
whether it promotes or retards the attainment of desired ends.").
219. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.1(b), at 3 (3d ed. 2000)
("But lawyers also play a part, outside of the criminal law, in the area of crime
prevention through laws designed to improve social and economic conditions -
those relating to public housing, zoning, public health, industrial working
conditions, minimum wages, unemployment compensation and such matters.").
220. See MINDA, supra note 4, at 24 ("During the first part of this century,
the study of jurisprudence was like an inductive science: principles of law were
pragmatically derived from the raw data of appellate opinions much in the same
way that the laws of nature were derived from scientific experiments."); Cox,
supra note 48, at 92, 94 ("[I]t is important to again recognize that the classical
formalists were engaged in an inductive project of identifying principles that
would reconcile, systematize, and render coherent the common law ....
Science, for classical formalists, entailed the paradigm of a closed logical
system. The objective was to render law on the model of geometry.").
221. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 472 ("A significant aspect of the
[Roscoe] Pound concept of interests is that they have no fixed values which are
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legal doctrine is the degree to which it effectively responds to
an existing social problem or helps to achieve a particular
desirable goal.222 It is the practical consequence of the legal
doctrine in the world, not its logical consistency with
preexisting precedent and principle, that serves as the
benchmark against which to measure its desirability and its
quality.223
Therefore, for example, in tort law a court should
determine whether a formal legal duty should exist for a
therapist to warn another of the possible danger posed by a
patient on the basis of its analysis of the practical costs and
benefits that would likely to be generated by the adoption of
such a duty, and alternatively by its absence.224 Similarly, a
court should decide if the jurisdiction in question should
embrace a formal duty to affirmatively aid as part of its tort
law by comparing the societal costs and benefits of adopting
such a rule with the likely practical consequences of not doing
SO.
22 5
Clearly a legal scholar working in a post-realist era and
within the instrumentalist paradigm who desires to do more
than to merely describe the analysis reported by a court in its
opinion, and who also wants to evaluate that analysis and to
perhaps offer suggestions for improvement, must now fully
engage the world outside of the law library.226 In contrast to
the far more philosophical and internal focus of traditional
eternal and immutable. On the contrary, they rise and fall in value in direct
proportion to the demands of the given time and place."); CARDOZO, supra note
38, at 26, 28 ("Hardly a rule of today but may be matched by its opposite of
yesterday .... Nothing is stable .... All is fluid and changeable.").
222. See Vermeule, supra note 158, at 2121 ("[L]egal instrumentalism
amounts to using law 'as a means to an end."' (quoting TAMANAHA, supra note
19, at 6)).
223. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 241 (describing an instrumentalist
judge as one who, "strives to achieve ideologically preferred ends in each case
and interprets and manipulates the legal rules to the extent necessary to
achieve the ends desired.").
224. See Scordato, supra note 23; Lake, supra note 72, at 106.
225. See Scordato, supra note 40, at 10-15; David A. Hyman, Rescue Without
Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653
(2006).
226. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 228 ("Proponents of an instrumental
approach to law, from Pound to the Realists, to the legal process school, to
contemporary legal pragmatists, have urged that judges pay attention to social
consequences and strive to achieve legislative purposes and social policies when
deciding cases.").
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formalism, instrumentalism demands that normative legal
scholarship take into consideration the practical costs and
benefits of competing versions of legal doctrine. 227  The
question of how regulated individuals will respond to one
legal rule as compared to another must now be asked and
answered.228
Was the court correct in the Tarasoff case that there will
be fewer injuries experienced by potential victims if a formal
tort duty exists for a therapist to warn the victim of a
patient's possible violent behavior? 2 9 Will the social cost of
false warnings and greater involuntary commitments of the
mentally ill be higher than the violent harm prevented?20 Is
a formal duty to affirmatively aid likely to result in better or
worse overall outcomes for those in peril?23 1 Would a tort
duty alone generate a significantly different outcome than a
criminal duty alone, or the two operating together?232
This bedrock requirement inherent in instrumentalism,
that normative legal analysis identify and analyze the
practical consequences of legal rules, poses more of a threat to
traditional legal scholarship than may at first appear. Legal
scholars engaged in such work must literally and figuratively
get out of the law library. They must move beyond the
materials with which they are familiar and expert, and they
must develop a sophisticated sense of the way in which
different entities in society normally operate and how they
perceive and respond to legal regulation.233  This is a
227. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 379 (1950) ("In the
last century we studied law from within. The jurists of today are studying it
from without. The past century sought to develop completely and harmoniously
the fundamental principles which jurists discovered by metaphysics or by
history. The jurists of today seek to enable and to compel lawmaking and also
the interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more account and more
intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to
which it is to be applied. Where the last century studied law in the abstract,
they insist upon a study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal
doctrines." (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 212-13
(1881)).
228. Id.
229. See Scordato, supra note 23, at 311-12 n.74.
230. Id. at 290-94, 300-04.
231. See Scordato, supra note 40, at 14-32.
232. Id. at 41-44.
233. See BIX, supra note 135, 172 ("What was to fill the conceptual gap left
when one's faith in the neutrality and determinacy of legal concepts was
undermined? For many of the realists, the answer was social science, the
[Vol:48410
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fundamental change in the long-standing professional role of
legal scholar, and there exists little tradition or precedent for
it.
2. The Hope for a Reprieve
Given the enormity of this change, it is understandable
that it may be initially denied, or ignored, or that alternatives
to it would be sought. One possible response that may appear
helpful is to take the position that legal scholars need not
rush out into the world to discover how persons actually
respond to legal rules and how they use them to resolve
disputes because many of these persons in fact come to them.
The thousands of volumes of appellate case reports that
reside in the law library each contain hundreds of examples
of actual disputes and their resolution in every imaginable
area of the law. A scholar who has become familiar with even
a modest percentage of these cases in a given area might be
able to claim to have little left to learn about the interaction
of the relevant legal rules with those who are regularly
governed by them.
After all, would we not assume that a sitting judge who
has for many years specialized in hearing criminal cases or
domestic dispute cases would have developed over that time a
deep instinct for the way in which criminals and couples
misbehave?234 Is this not one of the reasons that experienced
judges are generally preferred to novices?235 What better
understanding of how people actually behave, and the way in which legal rules
reflect or affect behaviour.").
234. See James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths about Summary
Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1540 (1995) ("[Tjhe presence of an
authenticating affidavit often will have little bearing on the ability of an
experienced judge to assess intelligently the weight and probative value of a
document; so why should its absence preclude the judge from giving the
document any legal effect whatsoever?"); Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan,
Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1767 (1982)
("[Tihe experienced judge will be able to point to a value or set of values that is
appropriate to resolve a particular litigated dispute or be able to perform a
thorough stocktaking and present an exhaustive account of the totality of values
housed.").
235. For example, Delaware is renowned for offering a state judiciary with
deep experience in corporate law to those considering incorporation. See
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985) ("The value of a Delaware domicile to firms is
more than an up-to-date code; Delaware also offers a comprehensive body of
case law, which is not easily replicated by another state, and a handful of
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guide could there be than such a person for predicting the
reaction of the relevant community to one possible legal rule
or another? While scholars are not judges with such direct
experience, they can claim the benefit of having access to the
written accounts of judges performing their professional role
in hundreds of thousands of cases in every jurisdiction in this
country for more than 100 years.
At first blush, this position has significant appeal. Upon
reflection, however, difficulties emerge. The focus of
normative legal scholarship is not confined to the application
of existing law to discrete disputes. It must also, of course,
evaluate the way in which regulated communities respond to
applicable law in the normal course and it must imagine how
these communities might respond to alternative versions of
that law or to entirely different regulatory approaches.236
Instrumentalism demands a keen sensitivity to the
behavioral effect that legal doctrine exerts on the normal
daily behavior of those who are regulated by it, and on the
ways in which customary routines are established around
existing legal requirements. 237  The resolution of specific
disputes covers only one limited aspect of the instrumentalist
focus on the effect of law on ordinary life.
One can readily see the limitations of this position. As
experienced as a judge may be, that experience is largely
confined to the function of law as a means of resolving
concrete disputes. Certainly that is the dominant focus of the
formal published reports of the courts' activities to which
legal scholars have access. Thus, while a practicing jurist
experienced judges. These factors afford firms greater predictability of the legal
outcomes of their decisions, facilitating planning and reducing the costs of doing
business.").
236. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 351, 364 (1973)
(noting that instrumentalist analysis, "involves the expression, interaction and
measurement of values in conflict, and the assessment of the implications for
those conflicting values of infinitely complex factual situations.").
237. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., How Does Law Matter?, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 265,
267-68 (1998) ("Law and economics is confident that we can use law to create
effective incentives and disincentives. In this sense, it reflects what I will call a
rationalist version of instrumentalism. Someone can accept instrumental
premises, however, but doubt that law can have much effect on behavior. What
I will call a skeptical version of instrumentalism argues that law primarily
should seek to accommodate existing behavior, rather than channel it in new
directions. Both versions of instrumentalism take behavioral consequences as
the touchstone of how law matters.").
[Vo1:48
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may well pick up enormous insight into the behavior of
persons who are routinely subject to the area of law in which
the judge presides, it is not likely that much of that
instinctive insight will be included in the formal memoranda
and decisions that fill the law reports that in turn fill the
shelves of the law library.
Additionally, the court's focus is necessarily on the
resolution of discrete disputes. This means that the
experience from which the court extrapolates its notions of
regulated community behavior is largely confined, at least
professionally, to the behavior of parties engaged in ongoing
litigation and parties who have been drawn into disputes that
require formal litigation to resolve.23 It might be difficult,
given this strongly weighted sample, to accurately imagine
the dynamics of the regulated community as a whole. That
would be like asking surgeons who specialize in cardiac
bypass surgery how they believe people in general will
respond to a new medication designed to decrease blood
cholesterol or to a dietary regime that excludes all sugar.
Still another problematic matter is the fact that the
overwhelming majority of the court materials that fill the
shelves of the law library are appellate court reports.239
Appellate courts rarely have direct exposure to the parties in
the case.24 ° They typically work only with the transcribed
238. See PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 56 (1985) ("[Llawsuits are filed in only 20 percent of automobile
claims, and only 1 percent are litigated to verdict ...."); Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 360 n.95 (1991) (reporting
that the percentage of auto injury cases going to trial in 1988-89 was only 0.9%
and that other personal injury suits went to trial at a rate of 2.4%). Factors
completely extrinsic to the representativeness or importance of the legal issues
involved, usually the anticipated expense of the appeals process and the amount
in controversy, play an enormous role in determining what questions and issues
will be considered by appellate courts. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After the
Trial Court: The Realities of Appellate Review, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC,
AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 60 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965); Bertram Wilcox,
Delmar Karlen & Ruth Roemer, Justice Lost - By What Appellate Papers Cost,
33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 934, 937 (1958).
239. ROY M. MERSKY & DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 11 (8th ed. 2002). (estimating that by the beginning of the 21st
century, there had been more than 6 million reported cases decided in the
United States, and that 200,000 additional cases are now published each year).
240. See ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 175
(2d ed. 1989) ("The function of appellate courts is to review the decisions of trial
courts, not to try the cases anew. This means that the record before the trial
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record from the proceedings below, the formal written briefs
of attorneys and, perhaps, a short period of oral argument.241
The experience of appellate courts with even the small
segment of the regulated community that becomes involved in
litigation is once removed and somewhat abstract.242
There are also many reasons to believe that only a weak
correspondence exists between the portrait of a regulated
community presented in appellate court opinions and the
actual reality of the situation.2 43  Factual investigation in
litigation is conducted by the parties themselves and is
infused with self-interest. 2" The factual presentation made
by each party to the trial court is profoundly influenced by
the specific set of disputed facts and issues in the case, by the
technical demands of proof required by the applicable legal
doctrine, by the posturing of each party seeking an advantage
in settlement and by the financial limitations of the parties.245
This is hardly reliable source material for a balanced view of
a regulated community.
court becomes the record before the appellate court.").
241. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1994) ("[A]n appellate court considers only
those facts that were established at trial and reviews only those questions that
were properly raised and presented in the trial court as evidenced by the
record."); John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes, in APPELLATE
PRACTICE MANUAL 84 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992) ("A brief may be the
only shot that counsel gets at the appellate court. The Eleventh Circuit, for
example, assigns 40 to 50 percent of its cases to the Non-Argument Calendar,
where they are decided on the briefs and the record. Other courts are moving in
the same direction with procedures such as affirmance by a simple order and
without argument.").
242. See DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL 467 (4th ed.
2000) ("In reality . . . the court of appeals will rarely look beyond the
transmitted record.").
243. See KENNETH REDDEN & STEPHEN SALTZBERG, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 12-13 (5th ed. 1990) ("[The Federal Rules of Evidence]
recognize that there are other policies served by rules of evidence aside from
reaching accurate decisions as to what happened in a particular case. In
dealing with offers to compromise evidence of insurance, subsequent remedial
measures, and privileges, for example, the Trial Judge must consider factors
other than accurate reconstruction of historical facts.").
244. See generally John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal
Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505 (2000) (considering several fundamental flaws
inherent in civil discovery); W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without
the Code, the Rules, or the Restatement: Or, What do Honor and Shame have to
do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567 (2003) (using civil
discovery as a case study to explore non-legal regulation as a means of
maintaining the ethics of honor within the legal profession).
245. See Scordato, supra note 23, at 296-98.
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It is also true that the availability, in fact the
desirability, of factual stipulations entered into by the
parties, admissions, formal presumptions and burdens of
proof can all work to significantly skew the factual picture
offered to the court.246 Moreover, the accuracy and the
thoroughness of the factual presentations at trial are often
burdened by the notorious unreliability of live witness
testimony, 247 and by longstanding rules of evidence that
exclude from a trial the presentation of unquestionably true
and relevant information if it is likely to be more prejudicial
than probative,248 or if it falls under one of a number of
recognized privileges. 249
246. See Rural Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. H.C. Jones Constr. Co., 149
S.E.2d 625, 631 (N.C. 1966) ("[Parties] may, by stipulation or judicial admission,
establish any material fact which has been in controversy between them, and
thereby eliminate the necessity of submitting an issue to the jury with reference
to it. Once a stipulation is made, a party is bound by it and he may not
thereafter take an inconsistent position."); see also Andrews v. Olaff, 122 A. 108,
111 (Conn. 1923) ("A stipulatory agreement thus arrived at ought not to be
disturbed or relief afforded contravening it, unless one party deceived the other
by false and fraudulent statements known to be untrue, or recklessly made
without regard to the fact, or definite information."); MARLA K. CLARK, 26
INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA § 10 (2004) ("[O]nce the parties enter into a
stipulation and the court approves it, the stipulation is binding on all involved,
even if one of the parties learns later through discovery that the stipulated facts
are not true."). Of course, courts should not accept stipulations agreed to by the
parties that are demonstrably false. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 497 (1951); Dillon, Read & Co. v. United States, 875 F.2d 293, 300
(Fed. Cir. 1989); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 4:8 (7th ed. 1992); see generally id. at §§ 3:1-3:45, 4:1-4:16
(discussing the burdens of proof in civil case, and the general principles of
inferences and presumptions ). The United States Supreme Court has
disfavored the use of mandatory presumptions in criminal cases, saying that
such presumptions intrude upon fact-finding function of the jury. Carella v.
California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
247. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 9-93 (Lexis Law Publishing 1997); Gary L. Wells, Scientific
Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY 230, 242-53 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
248. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). A trial
court's determination that evidence should be excluded on the basis of unfair
prejudice is typically given great deference by appellate courts. See Freeman v.
Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Only rarely-and in
extraordinarily compelling circumstances-will we, from the vista of a cold
appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the
relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.").
249. See UNIF. R. EVID.. 502 (attorney-client privilege); UNIF. R. EVID.503
416 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
Not only do all of these forces at work at the trial court
level justify tremendous suspicion about the genuine factual
accuracy of the presentations of the parties, but the appellate
judges do not even enjoy the benefit of direct observation and
exposure to the parties' live presentations, as does the trial
judge. 25 0 Their experience is limited to the written record of
the trial.251' Further, in cases of trials before juries who
return with a general verdict, it is common for the appellate
court to have before them only the written record of the
conflicting testimony offered by the parties at trial and the
jury's ultimate verdict, leaving them without a definitive
legal version of what transpired between these particular
parties in this specific case. Furthermore, even if the
appellate court was presented with a version of the facts in
the case that corresponded perfectly with what actually
occurred, the court would have no way of knowing with
confidence the extent to which the facts of this specific case
could accurately be extrapolated to the larger regulated
community.
For all of the foregoing reasons the published reports of
(doctor-patient privilege); UNIF. R. EVID 504 (marital privilege); see also David
W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956) ("[Wlhatever handicapping of the
adjudicatory process is caused by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great
a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations . . . ."); State v.
62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle Hundred, 193 A.2d 799 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963) (stating, "rules of privilege preclude the consideration of competent
evidence which could aid in determining the outcome of a case."); KENNETH S.
BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (6th ed. 2006) ("[T]he rules of privilege.
. . are not designed or intended to facilitate the fact-finding process or to
safeguard its integrity. Their effect instead is clearly inhibitive; rather than
facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light."); CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 285 (3d ed. 2003) ([Privileges]
are not designed to enhance the reliability of the fact finding process. On the
contrary, they impede the search for truth by excluding evidence that may be
highly probative.").
250. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL 5-6 (2002)
("Trial judges are in the business of trying cases. With the parties and
witnesses appearing before them in person, good trial judges become astute at
assessing credibility, finding facts and fairly resolving the human dramas that
lawsuits embody. Appellate courts, on the other hand, are much more scholarly
in both style and substance. The human drama is abstracted to legal principles
applied to previously found facts. The court reviews the cold pages of a record
and trial transcript, devoid of eye contact, voice, appearance and body
language.").
251. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
292 (1993).
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courts, especially appellate courts, simply cannot serve as
reliable guides to the likely behavior of the regulated
community when performing serious instrumentalist analysis
of legal doctrine.252 Legal scholars engaged in normative legal
scholarship in the post-realist era have little choice but to
look out and examine the world through sources not typically
available in a law library. 53 This is no small challenge to a
profession that has little experience, little training and
virtually no tradition in this kind of academic work.
3. Two Important Responses to the Challenge
From this perspective, one can view two of the dominant
trends that have emerged in legal scholarship in the past
twenty years as being, at least in part, responses to this
critical challenge. One is the movement toward greater
interdisciplinary legal scholarship. 5 4  The other is the
marked increase in interest and support for empirical legal
scholarship.255  Both of these trends seek a path to an
252. For an excellent and interesting explication of this point, see PHILIP
SHUCHMAN, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 24-60 (1979).
253. It is interesting to note in this context that few, if any, legal scholars
have seriously suggested that adjudicative procedures be redesigned in such a
way as to increase the purely investigatory capabilities of the civil or criminal
trial. Indeed, trials are generally recognized to be forums that seek to provide
the fairest possible resolution of legal disputes, engaging in historical fact
finding only in those ways, and only to the extent, necessary to satisfy that most
basic function. The problem arises when legal scholars substitute the very
limited and specialized fact finding efforts of the courts for more thorough and
accurate empirical research into the behavioral characteristics of regulated
communities.
254. See Posner, supra note 80, at 1316-17 (noting the growth in
interdisciplinary legal scholarship).
255. See George, supra note 12, at 141-42 ("Empirical legal scholarship (ELS)
is arguably the next big thing in legal intellectual thought .... ELS recently
and dramatically has expanded in law reviews, at conferences, and among
leading law faculties."); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A
Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 528-30 (2000) (reporting that "number
crunching" is rising in law journals); Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal
Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 168 ("A prominent, if
not yet consensus, view within the legal academy is that legal scholars should
produce more empirical research."); Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data:
The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1,
2 n.2 (collecting various sources that have advocated for more empirical legal
scholarship.).
The theme for the Association of American Law Schools' 2006 Annual
Meeting was "Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should
We Study It?" N. William Hines, The Newsletter of the Association of American
Law Schools, 2006 Annual Meeting Theme: Empirical Scholarship: What
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academic model of regulated community behavior that can be
deployed in normative doctrinal analysis.2"6 Interdisciplinary
work looks for these models in the existing work of other
academic disciplines like economics,257 sociology, 25 8 history,2 59
psychology26 ° and, interestingly, literature. 26 ' Empirical legal
scholarship seeks to develop the models directly.
262
While both movements offer reasonable responses to the
challenges faced by normative instrumentalist legal analysis,
and while both movements have thus far produced important
and interesting work, significant issues are raised in the
active pursuit of these strategies by legal scholars. A few of
these problems are briefly mentioned below.
a. Insufficient Predictive Capability
One significant difficulty, faced particularly by
interdisciplinary legal scholarship, is that many of the
academic disciplines in which help is sought do not offer a
Should We Study and How Should We Study It?, No. 2005-2, at 10 (Apr. 2005).
Lest there be any doubt that the movement towards empirical legal scholarship
is a natural, even inevitable, outgrowth of the embrace of instrumentalism, the
second sentence of President N. William Hines' formal announcement of the
annual meeting theme reads: "The Rule of Law is, in the final analysis, nothing
more or less than an orderly means for achieving a society's moral, economic
and social objectives." Id.
256. See NATALIE E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1997) ("At the Johns
Hopkins University Institute, law professors like Walter Wheeler Cook and
Hessel Yntema, and their assistants, set out to use social science methods and
models to penetrate to the hidden springs of the law.").
257. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 134.
258. See, e.g., DENNIS JAMES GALLIGAN, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (2007)
(examining the underlying idea that the legal system is highly developed social
system that has a distinctive character and structure, and that shapes and
influences behavior); SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS (2002).
259. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
260. See, e.g., SEMIR ZEKI & OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW & THE BRAIN (2006);
LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998).
261. See, e.g., LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: LAW AND
LITERATURE AS ETHICAL DISCOURSE (Paul J. Heald ed., 1998); IAN WARD, LAW
AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES (1995); JAMES BOYD WHITE,
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE
(1998) (1988).
262. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) (providing a careful and detailed discussion of the
relationship between legal realism and empirical research).
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highly developed body of predictive work.263 The social
sciences in particular have not been very successful in
developing sophisticated models that can accurately predict
the future actions and reactions of their subjects, except
perhaps at the simplest level.2' Neither psychology nor
sociology currently provide predictive theories of the sort that
is likely to be valuable in instrumentalist legal analysis. 265
The lone exception here is economics, and this surely helps to
explain why law and economics has thus far been the
breakout star of interdisciplinary legal scholarship.266
Moreover, if these traditional social sciences have yet to find
success in this endeavor within their respective disciplines,
why would one expect empirical work engaged in by legal
263. See Mitchell, supra note 255, at 187 ("For a host of reasons, individual
empirical studies of human behavior in social settings provide very limited
information about the nature of behavior."); JOHN 0. WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES I: A METASCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION 6, 29 (1987) ("We
may now turn to the failure of the social sciences, insofar as they have failed to
come up with answers or significant contributions or discoveries. This failure
has indeed been widely felt among the social scientists themselves ....
Theoretical knowledge in the social sciences is scanty.").
264. See KATHRYN DEAN, JONATHAN JOSEPH, JOHN MICHAEL ROBERTS &
COLIN WIGHT, REALISM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 (2006) ("The
contemporary social sciences are in a state of theoretical fragmentation. A
dizzying array of approaches jostle for attention, each making grander and often
increasingly radical claims about the nature of human life and the best method
of studying it.... [Tihe depth of disagreement among the various approaches is
such as to render virtually impossible the attempt to map the contours of
contemporary social theory. Indeed, it is often difficult to say that the theories
are attempting to address the same object, or even engaged in the same
enterprise."); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 68, at 79 ("Realists sometimes
(overly) optimistically suggested that social science might be able to identify the
social good, or at least how its achievement could be facilitated through law, but
nothing came of this."); Gordon, supra note 97, at 2087 ("Social science is a
value-soaked, fuzzy, messy, dispute-riddled, political enterprise like any other
interpretive activity - like law, for instance. But unless it is total hack work or
ideological claptrap, the sketch maps it draws are better than nothing - and
nothing about the actual workings of the legal system is what the traditional
doctrinal education typically provides.").
265. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 222-23 ("[Tlhe Realists, like others of
their time, placed an inordinate faith in the capacity of social science to help
point the way. . . .The old faith that science will supply answers to these
questions now smack of naivet6 - the natural and social sciences are themselves
caught up in the battles among groups, with contrary studies enlisted to serve
all sides.").
266. See WISDOM, supra note 26, at 120-21, 129-31 ("The academic social
sciences have produced no] [explanatory social theories] at all outside the field
of economics.").
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scholars to be more successful? 267
b. A Lack of Relevant Training and Experience
Another serious difficulty with both interdisciplinary and
empirical legal scholarship, at least when practiced by legal
scholars, is that there is virtually nothing in the traditional
training and experience of law professors, save for the
acquisition of knowledge about law and legal processes, that
would adequately prepare them to do such work in a serious
way.268 The central tension here is between law schools as
institutions engaged predominately in professional education
and a widely accepted expectation that law professors should
be scholars who, as part of their normal professional portfolio,
are regularly engaged in instrumentalist normative legal
analysis. 269 The consequence of this tension bears down on
law professors from at least two directions.
The first is that it is still overwhelmingly the case that
law professors receive their graduate training, most often
their only graduate training, in law school, and are taught
there by professors who also received the same graduate
training in their youth.27 0 During their last two years of law
school, they may have taken a few small seminars of as few
as twenty students that provided them the opportunity for
some sustained contact with a faculty member. They may
have worked as a research assistant for a semester or a
summer. They most likely completed a single writing project
of no more than a compulsory thirty pages to satisfy the
requirements for graduation.271  But on the whole, they
267. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide (Between Law and
Political Science), 3 GREEN BAG 2d 267, 268 (2000) ("[F]or the most part, [legal
scholars] lack the training to be contributors to empirical political science
scholarship about law and courts.").
268. See Heise, supra note 204, at 817-18 (noting the lack of training for
empirical research possessed by most law school faculty members).
269. See generally Scordato, supra note 102, at 372-84.
270. Posner, supra note 80, at 1323 ("Most law professors who engage in
interdisciplinary legal scholarship have not gone through the graduate school
Ph.D. mill; their only degree is a J.D."); Richard E. Redding, "Where Did You Go
to Law School?" Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and its Implications for Legal
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 613 (2003) ("Although holders of doctoral
degrees are increasingly common on law faculties, it is unrealistic to expect that
a doctorate will soon become de rigueur for law teachers. Requiring the
doctorate would, at least for the foreseeable future, greatly and unnecessarily
narrow the pool of legal academics.").
271. See Nancy Millich, Building Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple "Sesame
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enrolled in required first-year courses and core upper-level
electives that were designed to introduce and to survey the
subject matter, that culminated in a final examination and
that were taught in a lecture hall to a large number of
students who nearly all expected to engage in the practice of
law after graduation. And yes, most law professors have also
passed at least one state bar examination. 2
Contrast this experience with the typical training
expected of a professional scholar in the field of psychology,
sociology, economics, finance or literature. 3  Academics in
those fields typically complete both a masters program and
then a highly specialized doctoral program that involves
intensive apprenticeship with an established professor in the
field and culminates in the production of a significant work of
original scholarship in the form of a dissertation, traditionally
subsequently published as the new academic's first book.274
This training, especially the doctoral program, is specifically
designed to provide the graduate student with the skills and
the experience needed to successfully pursue a career as a
Street Skills" and Sophisticated Educational Learning Theories in Teaching a
Seminar in Legal Analysis and Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1130
("Many law schools require that every student undertake some significant
writing after the first year as a condition of graduation. This upper-division
writing requirement can typically be satisfied by producing a substantial
research paper for a seminar dealing with a particular area of law or through
individualized directed research under the tutelage of a professor.").
272. See Deborah B. Luyster, Practitioners and Law School Faculty: Who's
the Real Lawyer?, 81 MICH. B. J. 46, 46 (2002) (noting that many law professors,
"have passed a state bar exam"); Mark E. Steiner, Cram Schooled, 24 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 377, 391 ("Many Texas law professors are licensed to practice law in Texas,
and most have passed at least one state's bar examination.").
273. See George, supra note 12, at 149-50 ("Law schools generally do not
teach courses in survey methodology, statistical analysis, or research design.
Graduate social science programs do. Indeed, it would be nearly impossible
today to get a doctorate in a social science without completing a mathematical
methods sequence.").
274. See Posner, supra note 80, at 1322 ("Whether the field is physics or
gender studies, economics or art history, the basic shape of the scholarly career
is the same and differs markedly from that in law. The career begins with
graduate study culminating usually in a book-length dissertation (in technical
fields such as economics a series of essays can often be substituted) as the basis
for the Ph.D. degree, which is the gateway to the tenure track."); see also
GREGORY M. COLON SEMENZA, GRADUATE STUDY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: HOW TO BUILD AN ACADEMIC CAREER IN THE HUMANITIES (2005);
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, THE COMPLEAT ACADEMIC: A CAREER
GUIDE (John M. Darley, Mark P. Zanna & Henry L. Roediger III eds., 2d ed.
2004).
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professional scholar in that field.275
Obviously, law schools could resolve this aspect of the
tension by hiring only those individuals to serve on their
faculty who have earned both a graduate law degree and an
academic Ph.D. While there is some indication that the
possession of a Ph.D. in addition to a J.D. is currently an
advantage when seeking appointment to a law faculty,276 and
while the above analysis makes some sense of this post-
realist trend, no law school, no matter how prestigious, has
announced, or has even suggested, that it would henceforth
hire only those with an academic Ph.D. as faculty members.277
Furthermore, to follow the inevitable flow of the argument, no
one has seriously suggested that those law school faculty
members who do possess a doctoral degree are engaged in
meaningful scholarship, or are properly fulfilling their
institutional role, only when they produce legal scholarship
that reaches out in an interdisciplinary fashion to their
doctoral field.278
275. Not only are the law professor authors of interdisciplinary and empirical
legal scholarship often lacking in sufficient formal training for such work, so too
are the law students who select and edit such work for publication in law
reviews. See Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer
Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1990) ("Academics had to fess up to a more
ignominious scandal; there is no peer review system for the articles that law
professors publish in law reviews. As a consequence, their articles do not
receive objective and qualified criticism - and respectability."); Heise, supra
note 204, at 814 n.39 ("Almost all academics, as well as a surprisingly large
number of law professors, find the absence of blind peer-review at most law
reviews, certainly the student-edited ones, almost scandalous."). But see Frank
Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein
and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 147-48 (2002) ("[Epstein and King] certainly
have not established the necessary inferences to support their proposal, and
they ignore the considerable literature criticizing aspects of the peer-review
process."); Frank B. Cross, The Nafve Environmentalist, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 477, 486 (2002) ("Peer review is demonstrably unreliable at screening
research for validity. It tends to be infected by ideological biases and replicate
the preferences of the editor and reviewers.").
276. See George, supra note 12, at 148 ("Northwestern University, the
University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Southern California (USC)
routinely hire entry-level candidates with social science doctorates.").
277. The closest that I have encountered is Dean David Van Zandt of the
Northwestern University School of Law who has written that "[tihe research
faculty of the future law school will be composed largely of academics with a
strong disciplinary training in one of the social sciences . . . ." David E. Van
Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 335 (2003).
278. See Epstein, supra note 78, at 1291 ("[L]awyers qua lawyers have no
comparative advantage in doing empirical work .... Lawyers should be able to
understand, interpret, and critique the work of social scientists, not replicate
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c. The Tension between the Legitimate Demands of
Instrumentalist Normative Scholarship and
the Instructional Responsibility of Law
Schools
The reason for not requiring that law school faculty
members possess a traditional academic doctoral degree, of
course, despite the nearly ironclad logic in its favor, is that
even those law schools whom are most impressively
represented by graduates currently employed as full-time law
professors send only a tiny percentage of their graduates off
to do such work 9.27  The overwhelming percentage of their
graduates, like the overwhelming percentage of graduates at
every American law school, pursue careers in the practice of
the profession of law. 28 0  American law schools are, at the
beginning and the end of the day, institutions of professional
education.28 ' Those who attend them, those who finance them
it.").
279. Yale Law School's website states that it "is the country's leading
institution for producing legal academics," and there is ample anecdotal
evidence to support this claim. Yale Law School, Law Teaching,
http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/lawteaching.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2007);
see also Posting of Rebecca Tushnet to Georgetown Law Faculty Blog, Teaching
Law Without a Yale Degree,
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-universityjaw/2007/07/teaching-law-
wi.html (July 11, 2007); see generally Entry Level Hiring Report,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/entry level-hiring-report/index.html
(Apr. 30, 2007, 23:50 PST).
In its survey of alumni from the classes of 1996-2000, Yale Law School
reports that three percent of all respondents worked in academia (including
both teaching and non-teaching positions) as their first job after law school and
that ten percent worked in academic teaching positions five years after
graduation. YALE CAREER DEV. OFFICE, WHAT YALE LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES
Do: A SUMMARY OF CDO's 5TH YEAR CAREER DEVELOPMENT SURVEY CLASSES
1996-2000, at 1, 3 n.3 (2001), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cdo-summary-memo-96_00.pdf
[hereinafter 5th YEAR SURVEY]. It should be noted that the report does not
distinguish between alumni teaching in law schools and those teaching in other
academic settings. See id. at 1 n.2.
280. See Steven Lubet, Closed Minds and American Law Schools?, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 949, 954 (1990) ("Only a few law students ever embark upon
academic careers. The vast majority become employed at large law firms and
other private institutions."). Yale Law School's 5th Year Survey of alumni from
the classes of 1996-2000 clearly indicates that the great majority of those
graduates are practicing law five years after graduation, with at least forty-
eight percent doing so in a private law firm setting. See 5th YEAR SURVEY,
supra note 279, at 2-3.
281. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a
Business Paradigm for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27
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and those who hire their graduates all expect that they will
provide at least a minimally adequate preparation for the
practice of law.28 2 The possession of an academic Ph.D., in
addition to a J.D., by members of the law school faculty is
widely understood to be tangential to that fundamental
283mission.
Thus law professors are generally, and quite
understandably, insufficiently trained to engage in
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 54 n.126 (1999) ("American law schools tend to be similar
regarding professional education, which is not surprising since the organized
bar plays a major role in the accreditation process.").
282. See AM. BAR ASS'N, 2006-2007 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, available at http'//www.abanet.orgllegaled/standards/standards.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2007). The American Bar Association's Standards for
Approval of Law Schools includes Standard 301 (a), which mandates that, "[a]
law school shall maintain an educational program that prepares its students for
admission to the bar, and effective and responsible participation in the legal
profession." Id.
Starting in 1954, Yale Law School launched an experimental program that
provided its students with intensive exposure to research, writing and the
appropriate social sciences. Brannon P. Denning, The Yale Law School
Divisional Studies Program, 1954-1964: An Experiment in Legal Education, 52
J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 371, 364-75 (2002). Modeled after a typical academic
graduate school experience, the program involved close faculty mentoring, many
small seminars, and a very significant independent research project. Id. at 274-
77. It was abandoned less than a decade after it started. Id. at 390.
Some of the more ambitious portions of the original program - the
emphasis on training the academic lawyer and making law school more
like an academic graduate school - were abandoned, apparently at the
faculty's insistence that the school remain focused on the three-year
LL.B. In addition, other than offering courses taught by non-lawyer
faculty, it was never clear how effective the Divisional Program was in
achieving its goal of integrating law with the social sciences beyond an
enthusiastic wave in their direction.
Id.
283. See Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of
Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 227
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) ("[A]lthough law professors
jealously guard their formal autonomy, law schools actually devote most of their
energies to teaching what is tested on the bar examination."); Michael J.
Madison, The Lawyer as Legal Scholar, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 76 (2003)
(reviewing EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW
ARTICLES, STUDENT NOTES, AND SEMINAR PAPERS (2003)) ("There are few
reasons for students to demand to learn scholarly skills. Few lawyers have any
professional need to produce law review articles. Outside of a handful of elite
law schools, few law students intend to become legal professors and therefore
need or want to learn the craft of scholarship."). But see Letter of Owen M. Fiss
to Paul D. Carrington, in "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 26 (1985) ("Law professors are not paid to train
lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to
discover.").
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professional level empirical or interdisciplinary scholarship.2 4
This might well be where the imperatives of modern
instrumentalist legal analysis lead, but when they do they
come into stark conflict with the teaching function of the law
school and its faculty.28 5 Under the formalist paradigm,
teacher, scholar, practitioner and student alike were thought
to be characterized by their focus on traditional legal analysis
as the primary intellectual skill and this belief served to
harmonize the teaching and the scholarship functions of law
professors.28 6 In contrast, the skills required for serious
instrumentalist analysis at a professional level are rather far
removed from the skills needed to thrive in the practice of
law.
287
This then leads to a second source of the above identified
tension that falls upon law faculty. Not only are they, in the
main, inadequately trained to engage in serious empirical
analysis of the external effect of legal doctrine, but the more
they acquire such training, the more sophisticated they
become in the tools of academic empirical research and the
methods and understandings of other academic disciplines.
As a result of this more sophisticated approach, the gap
between their professional lives as scholars and their
284. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 6, 15 (2002) ("[Tlhe current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply
flawed ... serious problems of inference and methodology abound everywhere
we find empirical research in law reviews and in articles written by members of
the legal community."); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1327, 1343 (2002) ("Research by law students and professors with no
formal training in social science methodology provides constant reminders of
the limitations of armchair empiricism.").
285. See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 169 ("From the policy science
perspective, the successful teaching of law demanded of students that they
endeavor to cultivate the very methodological skills which, according to [Harold]
Lasswell, were in short supply among trained social scientists. This was, to say
the least, rather a tall order, and it is hardly remarkable that students should
have proved resistant. 'My classmates seemed, in general, to have a negative
reaction,' one student commented of [Myres] McDougal's classes in particular.").
286. See Ulen, supra note 200, at 404 ("Until relatively recently there was no
inherent tension arising from the law professor's roles as a successful trainer of
professionals and a successful scholar.").
287. See generally Posner, supra note 80, at 1324 ("Doctrinal scholarship may
have been (may be) dull and limited, but it is useful and it is conducted under
conditions that ensure minimum quality. Those conditions - a large
professional audience; a common academic culture; continuity with teaching,
judging, and performance as a student; and law review editing - are missing
from interdisciplinary legal scholarship . . ").
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professional responsibilities as teachers of law students grows
greater.2 8 It is almost certainly the case that some practicing
attorneys in some practice niches encounter and must deal
with empirical research and models of the sort used in
academic scholarship.2 9 It is also equally certain that a
seminar or an upper-level elective on empirical research and
modeling would likely make a valuable addition to a law
school's curriculum. 290  But that is a far cry from implying
that a facility with sophisticated empirical tools and models,
and with the professional research techniques and current
body of literature of other academic fields, is a necessary
component of professional legal training.29' And yet, the
nature of instrumentalist analysis in the post-realist era calls
for exactly that of those who must regularly discharge the
teaching function, the faculties of law schools.292
d. An Unlimited Jurisdiction for Normative Legal
Scholarship
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the serious
pursuit of instrumentalist research regarding law and legal
regulation in our society will inexorably lead to a progressive,
limitless broadening of the intellectual jurisdiction for law
schools and for legal scholarship. There is essentially no
human activity in our society that is not either touched by
legal doctrine or legal regulation of some sort, or about which
288. See Scordato, supra note 102, at 372-84 (arguing that expecting law
professors to actively create both legal scholarship and classroom instruction
diverts time and resources from the law school teaching function).
289. See Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life's Golden Tree:
Empirical Scholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 104 (2006)
("[L]awyers increasingly encounter methodologically sophisticated evidence and
arguments in their work.").
290. See Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a
Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347,
365-66 (1995) (suggesting that law schools, "[olffer advanced upper-level classes
in empirical or statistical methodology.") (emphasis omitted).
291. See Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the
Integration of Science into the Practice of Law, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 2-3
(1998) ("Unfortunately, although interdisciplinary tools have been made
increasingly accessible to lawyers, the typical J.D. curriculum provides no
preparation in the skills needed to determine substantive facts beyond legal
doctrine, nor in the scientific content and analytic methods necessary to assess
and support factual conclusions.").
292. See Ulen, supra note 200, at 404 ("[Tlraining students to be
professionals is a very different undertaking from that of training students to be
scholars.").
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a conscious decision has been made to forgo legal
regulation.2 93  If the post-realist understanding of the
rationale for existing legal doctrine is an instrumentalist one,
based ultimately not upon a deductive application of
precedent and principle but on a balancing of practical costs
and benefits, then one who would engage in sophisticated
scholarship in a given area of law must also become fully
conversant and expert in the nature and operation of the
regulated community.
Perhaps for any one particular legal scholar, with the
field of law sufficiently narrowly defined and with her
training and skills uniquely suited to the special area of
interest, this goal may be feasible. But for law schools and
legal scholarship collectively, this newly understood scope of
appropriate study and expertise is virtually unlimited. Once
one fuses the nature of our modern administrative state with
the prevailing post-realist instrumentalist paradigm, what
kind of academic expertise about the nature of the world and
its inhabitants could not arguably be made part of legal
scholarship?2 94
Practically everything that we can observe, and almost
anything that we can imagine, is either the subject of legal
regulation or is the subject of a conscious decision not to
regulate. Should legal standards be established for
automobile emissions or engine fuel efficiency in an effort to
reduce global warming?295 Do laws prohibiting development
on certain tracts of land in order to protect the continuing
survival of an endangered species make sense and are there
other possible versions of such regulation that would better
achieve that goal?296  Is the development of a new drug
293. See Vermeule, supra note 158, at 2132 ("More and more domains of
social and political life have been legalized.").
294. See id. ("As various forms of instrumentalism have spread through the
legal culture since, say, the 1970s, the boundaries of law's empire have if
anything expanded relentlessly.").
295. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information
Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 195-98 (2004) (arguing "as information gaps become
less pervasive, institutional design options for addressing environmental
problems will expand and we will be able to rethink our regulatory choices");
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515
(2004) (arguing the importance of focusing on individuals behavior to reduce
pollution).
296. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Moore, "I'll Take Two Endangered Species,
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sufficiently different from one or more existing drugs to
deserve the issuance of a patent?29 7 Is this song, play, novel
or film sufficiently the same as one or more existing ones to
constitute legal plagiarism?298 Would one or another possible
version of a particular doctrine of matrimonial law most
effectively minimize the rate of separations and divorces?299
Should a specific religious belief and practice that causes
harm to another trigger civil liability?300 Should especially
evil thoughts and intentions increase the possible penalty
when those thoughts can be shown to motivate a criminal
act?
30 1
Virtually every legitimate field of academic study could
plausibly be shown to be relevant to instrumentalist legal
analysis, and thus within the colorable province of normative
legal scholarship. The fundamental issue, then, regarding
interdisciplinary and empirical work should not be whether
they can get a legitimate sustainable start in legal
scholarship but just exactly where we expect them to end.
Please". Is the Commercialization of Endangered Species a Valid Activity that
Should be Permitted Under the Endangered Species Act to Enhance the Survival
of the Species?, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (2007); Josh Thompson, Critical
Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Designation, Re-designation, and
Regulatory Duplication, 58 ALA. L. REV. 885 (2007).
297. See, e.g., Brittany Whobrey, International Patent Law and the Public
Health: Analyzing TRIPS' Effect on Access to Pharmaceuticals in Developing
Countries, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 623 (2007); Obijiofor Aginam, Between Life and
Profit: Global Governance and the Trilogy of Human Rights, Public Health and
Pharmaceutical Patents, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 901 (2006).
298. See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt, Plagiarism in Cyberspace: Learning the
Rules of Recycling Content with a View towards Nurturing Academic Trust in
an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2006); Stuart P. Green,
Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 167 (2002).
299. See, e.g., Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the
Western Legal Tradition, 50 Loy. L. REV. 407 (2004); Katherine L. Caldwell, Not
Ozzie and Harriet: Postwar Divorce and the American Liberal Welfare State, 23
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1998).
300. See, e.g., Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental
Health Care Decision-Making for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1994); Paula Ann Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of
Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief
and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319 (1991).
301. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and
Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2004); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?,
80 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2000).
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Law schools would no longer reside in just a single building
somewhere on campus, but would, at least intellectually,
stand astride the entire university with normative
instrumentalist legal scholarship serving as the gatekeeper
whose academic expertise is to translate the knowledge of all
of the other disciplines into regulatory prescriptions." 2
Such a vision, of course, is ridiculous. Yet that is where
the logic of normative instrumentalist analysis inexorably
leads. Legal scholarship and legal scholars operating under
such a conception are unlikely to be ushered to a place of
preeminence in the modern university." 3 It is far more likely
that they will slide into increasing irrelevance and
obscurity. °4
VI. CONCLUSION
For most persons currently working as full-time law
professors, there is no real choice to be made between a belief
in traditional formalism and adherence to modern
302. See Emily Sherwin, Legal Rules and Social Reform, 36 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 455, 455 (1999) ("Modem legal scholarship has lofty ambitions for law.
Some would enlist the courts in utopian social reform, hoping that visionary
adjudication will bring about a more egalitarian, more caring, more civically
responsible, or otherwise more perfect society. Others would turn to social
science to generate new blueprints for law.").
303. In his bestselling 1987 book, The Closing of the American Mind, Allan
Bloom, a noted classicist who served as a faculty member at the University of
Chicago, Cornell, Yale and the University of Toronto, does not count law among
the "small number of disciplines that treat the first principles of all things."
ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 261 (1987). He instead
views it as an "applied science" that is "lower in dignity and derivative in
knowledge." Id.; see Jonathan R. Macey, Allan Bloom and the American Law
School, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1038 (1988); Lubet, supra note 280; see also
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918) ("[In point
of substantial merit the law school belongs in the modern university no more
than a school of fencing or dancing").
304. See Rhode, supra note 284, at 1331 ("Baldly stated, the uncomfortable
fact is that too much of the legal scholarship now produced is of too little use to
anyone. A survey undertaken for this Essay found that, of all law review
articles published during the 1980s and early 1990s, more than half had never
been cited. Other studies report similar findings."); see also Gordon, supra note
97, at 2076-77 ("The legal-academic machine is undoubtedly cranking out a good
deal of useless blather: articles that seem to have hardly anything to do with
addressing or understanding any legal problem, articles clotted with hermetic
jargon or puffed up with self-indulgent posturing, articles clumsily practicing
intellectual modes that people in other fields execute with much more grace and
precision, articles borrowing intellectual fashions that would be better off never
having been invented.").
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instrumentalism.3 05 Having read thousands of reported cases
and studied the doctrines and procedures of the law for many
years, few can honestly say that what they observe is
adequately captured by the traditional formalist account. °6
No matter how satisfying such a view of the law and the
operation of the legal system might be, and no matter how
well it works to harmonize the teaching, scholarship and
practice of the law and to define the role of law schools and
legal scholarship within the larger university, most law
professors have simply concluded that legal realism comes
much closer to accurately describing the reality they observe
and study than does formalism.0 7
Thus, at least within law schools, where virtually every
attorney initially encounters and begins to come to terms
with a basic understanding of the nature of law, realism
reigns."' The deeply comforting and benign notion that the
common law is largely the product of abstract inductive
analysis and that the resolution of specific legal disputes is
achieved through the objectively deductive application of
existing precedent and principle is no longer believed to be
true.30 9 Law is understood to necessarily include value-laden
305. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 246 ("[A] return to former non-
instrumental understandings of law... appears impossible.").
306. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 156
(1988) ("[Clourts do not begin with doctrinal propositions adopted in past texts
and work backward to determine their validity; they begin with a set of
institutional principles and word forward to generate the legal rules."); G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 281 (1973) ([A] notable
element of Realism was its repudiation of formalistic deductive logic in judicial
opinions as an artificial construct employed to conceal the subjective
preferences of the judge.").
307. See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 2 ("Now, a century after the legal
realists' attack on formalism, we all surely would say that formalism is gone.
Everyone recognizes, of course, that the values of the judges making the
decisions largely determines all law, and particularly constitutional law.").
308. See LEITER, supra note 43, at 21 ("Realism is omnipresent in American
law schools .... ).
309. One of the most famous quotes by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
appears at the very beginning of his book, The Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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judgments that force those who create doctrine and those who
apply it to choose among competing alternative versions of
the public good.31°
Law is thus seen as an instrument of the collective, one
among many, which can be used in an attempt to solve
specific societal problems and to achieve desired goals.3 11 The
choice of one version of a legal doctrine over another should
be driven by the anticipated practical consequences of each
alternative. 12 Sophisticated legal analysis does not look
merely to precedent and abstract principle for guidance, but
also vigorously considers the societal policies that are sought
to be advanced and tries to fashion a doctrine, or to apply
doctrine, in a manner best calculated to further those aims.1 3
This is instrumentalism.1 4
What happens to legal scholarship when the community
that produces it shifts from a formalist to an instrumentalist
paradigm? Legal scholarship that seeks to summarize,
organize and systematize the rationales for action provided
by legal decision makers themselves, what I have termed
first-order descriptive legal scholarship, can be expected to
suffer a dramatic decline in prestige among legal scholars. 5
This is the case because many legal decision makers continue
310. See BIX, supra note 135, at 166 (describing the theme for which the
American Legal Realist movement would be remembered as a critique of legal
reasoning: [T]hat beneath a veneer of scientific and deductive reasoning, legal
rules and concepts were in fact often indeterminate and rarely as neutral as
they were presented as being. It was the indeterminacy of legal concepts and
legal reasoning that led to the need to explain judicial decisions in other terms
(hunches and biases) and the opportunity to encourage a different focus for
advocacy and judicial reasoning: social sciences and 'public policy."').
311. SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 471 ("We forget how different the judicial
approach was at the beginning of the century. The dominant jurisprudence
then was analytic, with the judges marching to pitiless conclusions under the
prod of a remorseless logic which was supposed to leave them no alternative.
Since [Roscoe] Pound presented his sociological approach and theory of social
interests, the law in America has been considered a tool serving the ends of law
appropriate to the given society.").
312. See Vermeule, supra note 158, at 2117 ("One might use instrumentalism
as a rough synonym for consequentialism, the thesis that an act (or rule or
disposition) is good just insofar as its consequences are good.").
313. See SUMMERS, supra note 35, at 70-71.
314. Id. at 20-21. For an effort to elaborate upon, and to complicate, the
conventional notion of instrumentalism, see ROBERT S. Summers, Nave
Instrumentalism and the Law, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 119-31 (Peter
Michael Stephan Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977).
315. See sources cited supra notes 83, 89-90.
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to explain themselves in traditional formalist terms and such
explanations are no longer thought to be accurately
descriptive or to provide a reliable guide to future behavior. 16
Descriptive legal scholarship that attempts to expose the
indeterminacy and the inconsistency of formalist
explanations offered by legal decision makers, what I have
identified as one kind of second-order descriptive legal
scholarship, runs the risk of merely restating and repeating
the basic realist critique. 17 Moreover, to the extent that it
offers descriptive explanations for legal rules and legal
decisions that are insufficiently grounded in principle and
public policy - that are, put plainly, overly cynical-such
work risks rejection as being outside the purview of legal
scholarship and being unhelpful to the practical task of
engaging in the practice of law. 1
However, a second kind of second-level descriptive legal
scholarship is possible under the current instrumental
paradigm. This kind of scholarship attempts to describe the
law as an elaboration of a certain identified set of values or
social goals, such as economic efficiency.319 Because this kind
of second order descriptive scholarship implicitly embraces
the notion that lawmakers, be they appellate judges or
legislators, are fundamentally well intentioned actors seeking
the public good and that the product of their labor is a body of
precedent and statutory regulation that is essentially rational
and coherent, it is likely to enjoy a far more welcoming
reception among the larger legal community.2 °
316. See GILMORE, supra note 35, at 87; Arthur J. Jacobson, Taking
Responsibility: Law's Relation to Justice and D'Amato's Deconstructive Practice,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1755, 1755 (1996) ("Not one rule suffers from determinacy in
the United States today. Mere law words have completely stopped constraining
any judicial decision. I know. I've litigated.").
317. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5 at 810-12 (stating the realist critique of
formalism was in full swing by at least the mid 1930s).
318. See Simon, supra note 98 (characterizing Critical Legal Studies as, "a
now extinct and never very successful movement" and "extinct as a recognizable
movement"); Ulen, supra note 200, at 424 ("[Clritical legal studies, seem to have
had virtually no lasting effect on law or legal scholarship.").
319. See George L. Priest, The Rise of Law and Economics: A Memoir of the
Early Years, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 369 (Francesco Parisi &
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) ("The efficiency-of-the-law literature now is
voluminous").
320. Id. at 350 ("[Llaw and economics has commanded an influence
comparable only to the work of Langdell and the Realists. I doubt that there is
a single academic engaged in the intellectual life of modem legal scholarship
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However, scholarship of this sort, as interesting and
clever as it might be, does not seem to advance a hard
descriptive theory of existing law of the sort one might expect
to encounter in other descriptive academic work . 21  Little of
the insightfulness and the influence of this work seems to be
lost even if significant segments of existing common law in a
given area do not in fact conform to the underlying
descriptive theory. It is remarkable that so many legal
judgments made by hundreds of different appellate courts
over many different decades can be shown to conform to the
basic postulates of, say, law and economics, particularly when
the decision makers themselves are silent and seemingly
unaware of this dynamic. And it remains quite valuable even
if some established branches of common law doctrine do not
fit the model. While this is clearly descriptive scholarship, it
does not offer an account of the object of study that is, in a
traditional sense, either verifiable or definitively refutable.2 2
The shift from formalism to instrumentalism has a
potentially even more significant effect upon normative legal
scholarship than it does upon descriptive legal scholarship.
With its emphasis on precedent and principle, and the use of
abstract logical analysis, formalism allowed legal scholars the
luxury of finding nearly all of the materials needed for their
work inside the law library. Roughly in the same way that
appellate courts were thought to be involved primarily in
reviewing the choice of precedent and the deductive logic
who has failed to define carefully, if only in his own mind, the relationship
between his work and law and economics.").
321. See David Monsma, The Academic Equivalence of Science and Law:
Normative Legal Scholarship in the Quantitative Domain of Social Science, 23
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 157, 159 (2006) ("[The use of empirical research and
quantitative analysis, while indispensable in social sciences and encouraged in
empirical legal research, is not determinative of the academic quality of legal
scholarship or essential to the integrity of legal research."); Ronald J. Allen &
Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV.
1491, 1512 n.63 (2001) ("The neglect of even the most basic form of empiricism -
accurate description of relevant phenomena - in comparative legal scholarship is
astonishing; there is typically a yawning chasm separating what comparativists
writing in English say about systems and what is actually true of them.").
322. See Epstein & King, supra note 284, at 18 n.48 ("[Almici present
empirical evidence that often does not meet Huber's standard for good science -
'the science of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus
and peer review.' . . . We believe the same is true of a healthy portion of legal
scholarship published in the law reviews." (quoting PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (1991)).
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employed by trial courts, more or less checking their math,
legal scholars could be thought to be doing much the same
when they engaged in normative legal scholarship. 23
Decisions could be criticized for failing to properly
characterize existing precedent, or for failing to correctly
apply it to the facts of the instant case. 24 Logical extensions
of existing doctrine could be considered, as could the
appropriate treatment of situations and issues that had not
yet come before the courts. 25 In all of this normative work
under formalism the dominant intellectual tool is traditional
legal analysis and the essential materials are the statements
of the existing law and formal reports of its application. 26
Instrumentalism changes all of that. Now the essential
benchmark for evaluating an appellate court opinion is the
degree to which the change to the common law that it
announces, or chooses not to make, effectively advances the
underlying social goals that are sought to be achieved in that
area of law. 27 Legal scholars wishing to pursue normative
legal scholarship in the post-realist era have no choice but to
move the focus of their attention beyond precedent and
principle and towards the actual behavior and dynamics of
the regulated community.32 s They must become capable of
323. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLAssIcAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886-1937, at ch. 2 (1998) (explaining a way of
thinking about the law, articulated by judges).
324. See BIx, supra note 135, at 171 ("The classical perspective of judicial
decision-making was that judges decided cases by merely discovering the
appropriate legal rule, a process that required the mere application of simple
logical deduction from basic principles.").
325. See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 10 (defining formalism as "the endeavor
to treat particular fields of knowledge as if governed by interrelated,
fundamental and logically demonstrable principles of science.").
326. TAMANAHA, supra note 68, at 78 ("Rule formalism was the idea that
rules were applied by judges in a mechanical fashion to determine the right
answer in every case, without discretion on their part and without the
interjection of their values.").
327. See id. at 79 ("To replace formalist understandings, Realists advocated
an instrumental view that characterizes law as a tool to achieve desired social
objectives."); see generally SUMMERS, supra note 35.
328. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 599, 612-13 (1989) ("In focusing on the consequences of behavior under
law, the [instrumentalist] observer also places less attention on the legal
concepts of rights, as a normative framework for establishing correlative duties,
and instead focuses on behavioral consequences of various bundles of legal
entitlements. Consequently, 'rights and their correlative duties no longer hold
center stage' in the economic analysis of law.").
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predicting the likely practical consequences of alternative
versions of legal doctrine and alternative schemes of legal
regulation in the relevant segments of society.3 29 Because the
nature of fact gathering and fact finding in litigation does not
result in reliably accurate accounts of the regulated
community, legal scholars cannot rely on appellate court
reports to perform this function.330 They must move beyond,
and quite far beyond, the resources available in a law library.
The demands of instrumentalism on normative legal
scholarship pose enormous, and thus far largely
unappreciated, problems for legal scholars. How are they to
develop sophisticated and accurate predictive models that will
identify the likely consequences of different legal rules on
affected segments of society? One natural strategy, and one
currently popular trend, is to seek such models in other
academic disciplines, such as psychology, sociology,
economics, history and literature.3 31 Another is for legal
scholars to engage in their own empirical research.332 Both
approaches hold promise, but both also carry with them
significant problems, some of which are discussed above.33
From a larger perspective, normative legal scholarship in
the post-realist era faces two fundamental challenges, neither
of which is likely to be easily overcome. One is the problem of
authority. It is true that the shift from formalism to
instrumentalism has radically changed our notion of what
counts as a meaningful argument and a relevant
consideration in the formation of the common law. This
change affects the work of the appellate courts as fully as it
does the work of legal scholars seeking to describe and to
329. See Neil MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and their Consequences: From
Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239, 254 (1983) ("And surely it is in this
very way that behavioral consequences and outcomes matter to us. This follows
from the point that responsibility attaches for the foreseen and foreseeable
consequences and outcomes of one's actions. We cannot conceivably speculate on
all the things that will or might possibly happen if people react in some way or
another to a new ruling in law, but we can at least realize that they are entitled
to take the law to be as a court has ruled it to be. People are supposed to act
conformably to the law, and when they do act on the law as the court has ruled,
the judges at least would be debarred from saying that they hoped it would not
be so.").
330. See supra Section V.B.2; SHUCHMAN, supra note 250.
331. See supra notes 251, 254-58 and accompanying text.
332. See supra text accompanying note 253.
333. See supra Part V.B.3.a.-d.
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evaluate that work.
Appellate courts are required in our current system to
review the legal sufficiency of the work of subordinate courts
and in the process to maintain and develop the common law.
If they must do so on an instrumentalist basis and without
the benefit of accurate predictive models regarding the
regulated community, then so be it. 334 They may have little
choice at present but to base their judgments on their
instincts and their intuitions.3  In any case, they are
decision makers who have been duly appointed, confirmed or
elected and they have been invested with the requisite formal
authority 36
Legal scholars who are engaged in the normative
evaluation of the work of these courts, however, enjoy no such
authoritative status. Therefore, when they criticize the work
of formal legal decision makers-on the basis, ultimately, that
their instincts and intuitions about the practical
consequences of various versions of legal doctrine differ-it is
hard to see why such commentary should be viewed as being
importantly different, or more authoritative, than other
formal reports and position papers that constitute public
policy analysis and debate in this country. 37 It may be
334. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 230 ("In tort cases, similarly, judges
routinely weigh such considerations as the deterrence effect, compensation for
victims, moral responsibility for actions that cause harm, availability of
products for consumers at affordable prices, consequences for the economy, costs
of injuries to society, implications for insurance, problems caused by excessive
litigation, taxing the resources of the court, and so forth. The analysis relies on
contestable political, scientific, moral, and economic issues, and on highly
speculative predictions of future consequences, all matters about which judges
have no particular expertise or reliable information. A judge who considers
these purposes and ends when applying legal rules is at sea in an
embarrassingly rich set of unconstrained options.").
335. Id.
336. See generally Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments
Conundrum, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 743 (2005) (discussing the selection of federal
appellate court judges); Symposium, The Judicial Appointments Process, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2001) (exploring the manner in which federal
judges are selected and suggesting ways in which the appointments process
may be maintained or adjusted to best serve interests of democracy).
337. See Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law
Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 825 n.85 (1991) ("This can be seen most
clearly by examining the relationship of the New Public Law scholarship to
other fields, most notably public policy and social science. This scholarship,
which focuses on planning and treats law as an instrumentality for achieving
defined purposes, certainly overlaps substantially with public policy research..
. . In fact, there is probably no intellectually meaningful argument for
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subtle, and it may not yet be widely acknowledged, but the
shift from formalism to instrumentalism inevitably results in
a profound contraction in the expertise, and thus the
authority, that legal scholars bring to normative legal
scholarship.
One obvious response to this problem of authoritative
scholarship is for legal scholars to seek, perhaps in
interdisciplinary and empirical legal scholarship, a more
objective and academic basis for their normative work.338
This raises the second fundamental challenge, and it has two
parts. The first can be thought of as a problem of jurisdiction.
Just what in this world could instrumentalist legal scholars,
collectively, risk not including in their academic purview if
they are to develop sufficient expertise to authoritatively
evaluate the legal and regulatory output of the modern
administrative state? In other words, what academic
discipline, and what subject of empirical investigation, could
possibly avoid analytical scrutiny by normative legal
scholarship? This expansion toward a boundless breadth of
inquiry and ever greater required expertise for normative
legal scholarship is more or less inevitable once an
instrumentalist view of law is adopted. Nevertheless, no
matter how latent it may remain, it is highly improbable that
other academic disciplines, and actual legal decision makers,
will be willing to grant to legal scholars this virtually
limitless academic jurisdiction and authority. 39
The second problem this fundamental challenge presents
is even more formidable. Given that the subject of academic
legal scholarship is principally the law and legal processes,
the search for an academic basis upon which to normatively
analyze and evaluate the subject becomes essentially the
search for an objective science of human governance. Just
how, within an instrumentalist paradigm, could legal
distinguishing between these fields in the first place.").
338. Madison, supra note 283, at 76 ("The emergence of high quality
interdisciplinary work by legal scholars is one of the most remarkable and
valuable developments in law schools over the last twenty years").
339. See Posner, supra note 80, at 1319 ("Law has been a university subject
in the United States for a long time, but as recently as the 1960s the law schools
stood to one side of the academic culture of their universities, structurally as
well as attitudinally."); TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 155 ("[T]he steady drift of
legal academics away from the practice of law comes at the cost of credibility
that the law professoriate has anything relevant to say to lawyers.").
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scholars plausibly hope to discover a sufficiently neutral and
objective foundation that would provide to their normative
work a genuinely academic status? Such a search, ironically,
is an expression of one of the most powerful yearnings of
traditional formalism. 340 Among the most influential insights
offered by legal realism is the implausibility, if not the
impossibility, of such a quest.34'
Thus legal scholarship in the post-realist era finds itself
in a highly uncertain state. 42 The recognized authority and
expertise of the legal scholar to engage in a normative
analysis of law has been sharply circumscribed by virtue of
the shift from formalism to instrumentalism and as yet no
plausible strategy exists to reclaim it. While first-order
descriptive legal scholarship is as available as before, the
relative importance and prestige accorded it has dramatically
declined.3 43  This leaves various kinds of second-order
340. CARDOZO, supra note 38, at 66 ("[Tjhe demon of formalism tempts the
intellect with the lure of scientific order."); Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor's
Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 655, 658
(1997) ("Americans at the founding of the United States well-accepted the idea
that the world, including worldly governments, is governed by laws or principles
that dictate how society ought to be structured, in the very same way that such
natural laws dictate how buildings ought to be built or how crops ought to be
planted." (citing Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and
American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993))).
341. See Pound, supra note 34, at 609 ("We do not base institutions upon
deduction from assumed principles of human nature; we require them to exhibit
practical utility, and we rest them upon a foundation of policy and established
adaptation to human needs."); Brian Z. Tamanaha, How An Instrumental View
of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 494 (2007) ("Many
observers ... interpret Legal realism and postmodernism to have taught that
the fundamental distinction between an objective perspective and a subjective
perspective is illusory.").
342. See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 170, at xliv ("The continued,
almost frenzied, oscillation from legal process theory to Rawlsian natural law,
from original intent to law and economics reveals more than a discipline
sampling different theories of interpretation. It may sound strange to say so,
but it also marks a problem of role which legal academics must confront every
day. What exactly are you? A social engineer, cutting beneath the legal
verbiage to find the deep social policies which inform a doctrinal field? A
natural lawyer, measuring the court's decision against the rule which would
have been reached behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance? A hired gun,
shouting out arguments faster than your students? A doctrinalist, parsing
pluralities and filleting footnotes to find the Supreme Court's real meaning? An
economic analyst of law, seeing every rule as merely a shorthand version of the
injunction to seek an economically efficient solution?").
343. Posner, supra note 80, at 1321 ("Traditional doctrinal scholarship is
disvalued at the leading law schools.").
438 [Vol:48
20081 THE NATURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 439
descriptive legal scholarship. Work of this sort, however, is
descriptive in more of a heuristic sense than in the type of
harder, refutable version of academic description that is
normally associated with the natural sciences.344
Post-realist legal scholarship can be therefore
understood, on the basis of this analysis, to be a kind of soft
social science or perhaps an academic discipline most closely
aligned with the humanities. 45 Sophisticated work in the
area provides interesting and insightful perspectives on a
recognized body of published materials. 46 It identifies and
develops possible themes and works out their implications. It
is valued to the extent that it is perceived as novel, perhaps
even counter-intuitive, and elegantly presented.3 47  But it
cannot really claim to be objectively true, and it suffers from
declining relevance and influence outside the legal
academy.348
344. See ROBERT NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO
CHICAGO AND BEYOND (2002) (arguing that modern economic theory is most
appropriately viewed as a form of theology); see also RELIGION AND ECONOMICS:
NORMATIVE SOCIAL THEORY (James M. Dean & A.M.C. Waterman eds., 1998)
(presenting a set of case studies of ways in which economics and theology may
actually have been combined in the real world); ECONOMICS AND RELIGION: ARE
THEY DISTINCT? (H. Geoffrey Brennan & Anthony Michael C. Waterman, eds.
1994) (considering the relationship between economics and religion and if
theology and economics are entirely autonomous and distinct areas of inquiry).
345. See Posner, supra note 169, at 1122 ("Doctrinal analysis today is a
humane rather than scientific discipline. As in the other humanities, great
emphasis is placed on writing well (sometimes on writing impressively--which is
not the same thing), footnoting copiously, treating every topic exhaustively, and
staying within the linguistic and conceptual parameters of the doctrines being
analyzed. Soundness is valued above originality, thoroughness above brevity;
originality, where it is present, tends, indeed, to be concealed.").
346. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV.
917, 917 (1986) ("In most fields of intellectual endeavor, the highest praise is
reserved for brilliant insights that overturn conventional thinking and common
sense .... Economists and legal scholars, never ones to be outdone by 'hard
scientists,' traditionally have applied the same standards in their own fields.").
347. See Farber, supra note 201, at 310 ("Scholarship is expected to be
original, and defense of the conventional wisdom provides few opportunities for
brilliance. The professor seeking scholarly recognition is well-advised to steer
away from the true but trite, in favor of the false but novel.").
348. See TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at 152 ("A comprehensive study of the
law review database, covering about 385,000 articles, found that 43% of
published articles are not cited at all - not by courts or law reviews - and 79%
of articles are cited fewer than ten times; a mere 1% of law review articles
account for 96% of all citations." (citing A Voice Crying Out in the Wilderness,
and Then Just Crying, http://therightcoast.blogspot.com/2005/07/voice-crying-
in-wilderness-and-then.html)); see also Michael D. McClintock, The Declining
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Those invested in legal scholarship need to begin a
serious assessment of its possible roles and functions in this
post-realist period. What unique expertise do law professors
as legal scholars bring to the table and what kind of research
and scholarship would be a productive application of that
expertise? How might scholarship that better serves the
needs of the bench and the practicing bar be identified and
encouraged? What is the relationship between the pursuit of
different kinds of legal scholarship and a law professor's
concurrent professional obligations as an instructor of law
students? These are important questions. As a practical
matter, they may not need to be addressed for law schools
and legal scholarship to continue much as they have, but they
must eventually be addressed before legal scholarship can
regain its respect and its influence in the larger world.
Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659
(1998); see generally Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?,
37 HouS. L. REV. 295 (2000); Harry T. Edwards, supra note 187.
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